ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

A journal designed for exploratory discussion of the problems of economic development and cultural change. This journal is published by the Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change at the University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, every October, January, April, and July. Preliminary versions of the research findings and research hypotheses are welcomed in the interest of provoking constructive and fruitful discussion.

Bert F. Hoselitz, Acting Editor

Volume III, Number 1 October 1954

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EDITORIAL

It is with great regret that we have to announce the temporary absence of the regular editor of this Journal, Mr. R. Richard Wohl, from this post for the coming year. Mr. Wohl is the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship for 1954-1955, which obliges him to relinquish all his duties other than research. We are looking forward to his return to Chicago and the post of editor of this Journal in the autumn of 1955 with the beginning of Volume IV. In the meantime, Mr. Bert F. Hoselitz has agreed to be Acting Editor of this Journal.

With this issue another change is introduced. In the past this Journal appeared at somewhat irregular intervals, but at least five numbers per year were published. Without reducing the total amount of pages to be issued every year, we will publish annually four issues. Each issue will have approximately 100 pages and the Journal will appear at the beginning of October, January, April, and July.

We have had numerous inquiries about back numbers of this Journal, especially about Volume I. We are now planning the microfilming of that volume, as well as several other scarce numbers of this Journal, and an announcement as to the availability of this service will be found on page 78 of this issue.
INTRODUCTION

The papers printed in this and the next issue of this Journal form the report of a conference on The Role of Cities in Economic Development and Cultural Change which was held at the University of Chicago from May 24th to May 26th, 1954. The conference was sponsored jointly by the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council and the Research Center on Economic Growth and Cultural Change at the University of Chicago. The work for the conference was initiated at a meeting of the Committee on Economic Growth in the spring of 1953. At that time an organizing committee was set up which included, besides myself as chairman, Wilbert E. Moore, Eric Lampard, and Milton B. Singer. Since I spent the period from July 1953 to March 1954 abroad, major credit for all the arrangements must go to my colleagues on the organizing committee. My own role consisted merely in suggesting that a conference on this topic be held and supporting this suggestion by an article outlining some of the problems in that field which might be of interest to social scientists. The article was published in the June 1953 issue of the Journal of Political Economy, and it was sent to the authors who contributed papers at the conference with the suggestion that in it an attempt was made to delineate in a general way the problems to be discussed.

It would be difficult to describe all the problems which the organizing committee had to face in finding and assuring the contributions of the various authors of the main papers and discussion notes of the symposium. I believe that their efforts were well rewarded and that they recruited a group of men as good or better than any other that could be found in the United States. As will be apparent from the contents of this and the next issue of this Journal, the subject matter was divided in five general areas. The demographic aspects of urbanization in relation to economic development were discussed by Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz Golden, the sociological problems by William L. Kolb, the cultural factors by Robert Redfield and Milton B. Singer, the historical trends by Eric Lampard, and the economic relations by Rutledge Vining. Since I had escaped the hard work of planning and arranging the conference, I could not refuse the organizing committee when they asked that I take over the task of summarizing and synthesizing, as far as possible, the problems raised in the other papers. My own interpretation of the potential areas of further research in this field and of the problems raised in the papers published here is summarized in the sixth paper which concludes the symposium. It should be emphasized that unlike the other five papers it is a summary of the discussion and findings, rather than an attempt to open up new problems in the general area of the interrelations between urbanization and economic development and cultural change.

In addition to the members of the organizing committee who accepted their charges on the assumption that they would be my helpers, but finally did the bulk of the work, our thanks go to the authors who undertook to prepare papers and discussion comments on them, as well as to all the persons who attended the conference and enriched it by their oral comments made in the course of discussion. Among those who did much effective planning and organizing behind the scenes should be mentioned especially Mr. Paul Webbink of the Social Science Research Council, whose patience and experience in helping to make the conference a success were invaluable.

The participants who actually attended all or most meetings in Chicago in May 1954 were:
Donald J. Bogue, University of Chicago
P. Chakrabartty, University of Wisconsin
Robert I. Crane, University of Chicago
Kingsley Davis, Columbia University
Otis D. Duncan, University of Chicago
Wolfram Eberhard, University of California, Berkeley
Fred Eggan, University of Chicago
Norton S. Ginsburg, University of Chicago
G. E. von Grunebaum, University of Chicago
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Philip M. Hauser, University of Chicago
Bert F. Hoselitz, University of Chicago
Everett C. Hughes, University of Chicago
William L. Kolb, Tulane University
E. A. Kracke, Jr., University of Chicago
Eric Lampard, Smith College
Harold M. Mayer, University of Chicago
Martin Meyerson, University of Pennsylvania
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Albert Reiss, Jr., Vanderbilt University
Milton B. Singer, University of Chicago
Wolfgang Stolper, University of Michigan
Rutledge Vining, University of Virginia
John A. Wilson, University of Chicago
R. Richard Wohl, University of Chicago

Bert F. Hoselitz

University of Chicago
URBANIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRE-INDUSTRIAL AREAS

The process of urbanization, known to be intimately associated with economic development, deserves close attention if we are to understand the recent and future mechanisms of change in pre-industrial areas. Yet up to the present our comparative knowledge of cities and of urbanization is slight, particularly for underdeveloped areas. Considerable interest was shown in the subject toward the end of the last century — in the works of Levasseur, Meuriot and Adna Weber — but since then, except for isolated cases such as Pirenne and Mark Jefferson, there has been little work done in the comparative analysis of cities and urbanization.

This does not mean that there has been no interest in cities. On the contrary, the literature on cities and city problems is enormous. But most of this material deals with a particular town or at most with a single province or country. Conspicuously absent are systematic comparative analyses putting together and interpreting data on the cities of different countries and different cultures.

Indeed, the study of cities and of urbanization has been heavily confined to countries of European culture. As a result many of our generalizations about urban phenomena, though treated as if they were universal, are actually limited to Western (and often to American or West European) experience and are wrong when applied to most of the rest of the world. In other words, there is as yet no general science of cities. Without such a general science, one cannot get far in analyzing and documenting the interrelations between urbanization and economic development.

The claim may be made that a comparative science of urban phenomena is impossible because the data are lacking for most of the world. But this view is hardly justified. In the first place, if we always waited for perfect information before attempting to build a comparative social science we would wait forever. In the second place, the data on cities are more numerous, more accurate, and more accessible than most people who have not looked into the matter seem to believe. The fact that the statistical materials are often lacking or inaccurate in a given country or for a given time, is not a signal for defeat. It is rather a challenge to ingenuity to make the best use of what is available and to supplement this with systematic estimates wherever necessary.

In the program of urban studies at Columbia University a modest effort, known as the World Urban Resources Index, is being made to gather and systematize basic data on all large cities. Since material from this project is utilized to some extent in what follows, the Index is described briefly in the Appendix; but the body of the paper draws upon a wider context of comparative work in so far as it bears on the relation of urbanization to economic development in pre-industrial areas.

Urbanization versus the Presence of Cities

At the outset a distinction must be made between urbanization and the mere presence of cities. Urbanization as the term is used here refers to a ratio — the urban people divided by the total population. It is therefore as much a function of the rural as of the urban population, the formula being as follows:

\[ u = \frac{P_c}{P_t} \]
where "u" is urbanization, "P_c" is city population, and "P_t" is total population.

Obviously the degree of urbanization in a given country or region can vary independently of the absolute number of people living in cities. India has more people in cities than the Netherlands, but it is far less urbanized than the latter. In other words, by transposing in the preceding equation, we find

$$P_c = uP_t$$

Since the two values "u" and "P_c" can vary independently, they have to be kept separate in any comparative analysis. Also, the sheer number of cities in a given country may be as much a function of total population as of degree of urbanization. The distribution of urbanization over the globe, in short, is not equivalent to either the distribution of cities or the distribution of urban inhabitants.¹

With respect to urbanization, there can be no doubt that the underdeveloped areas of the world have less of it than the advanced areas. If we take as underdeveloped, or pre-industrial, all areas with more than 50 per cent of their occupied males engaged in agriculture,² we find that only 9 per cent of their combined population lives in cities of 100,000 or over, whereas for the other countries (industrial) the proportion is 27 per cent. Table 1 gives the indices of urbanization for the world's countries and territories classified by

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1. To forestall needless debate, a word should be said about the rural-urban dichotomy. The lack of a standard dividing point between "rural" and "urban" has often been regarded as a serious if not overwhelming handicap to international comparisons of urbanization. Yet such a conclusion is unwarranted. The similarity of definition is greater than the citation of extreme examples usually suggests (see the Demographic Yearbook for 1952, pp. 9-12). Also, a detailed study of comparative urbanization would not in any case be satisfied with a simple urban-rural dichotomy, since a continuum is clearly involved. In the past too much emphasis has been placed on the dichotomy. The assumption has been that there are two mutually exclusive but internally homogeneous categories, and that all we need to do is count the number of people falling into each of them. But almost anyone will admit that a man living in a city of several million is, at least demographically, more urban than one living in a town of 10,000.

The better principle is to think in terms of an index of urbanization. One can use as an index the proportion of people in places of 10,000 and over, 20,000 and over, or any other figure one wishes. Actually, since there is a certain regularity about the pyramid of cities by size, the proportion in any major size-class tends to bear a systematic relation to the proportion in other size-classes. Thus the percentage of a population living in cities above 100,000 has a ratio to the percentage in places above 5,000 which is roughly similar from one country to another. An index of urbanization is therefore quite feasible for comparative purposes.

2. This index of economic development seems to be both convenient and reliable. In the Population Division of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University the index has been computed or estimated for all the countries and colonies of the world. These figures are used throughout the present paper in designating countries as "industrial" or "pre-industrial."
Table 1

DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IN WORLD’S COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES CLASSIFIED BY DEGREE OF AGRICULTURALISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent of Gainfully Occupied Males in Agriculture</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Per cent of Population in Cities 100,000-plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 - 19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-plus</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

degree of agriculturalism. It can be seen that the degree of urbanization increases sharply as industrialism increases.

It follows that those parts of the world still mainly in the peasant-agrarian stage of economic development manifest the least urbanization. A continental breakdown, as given in Table 2, shows that Asia (excluding the USSR) and Africa are the most agrarian and the least urbanized continents.

Table 2

PER CENT OF POPULATION IN CITIES AND IN AGRICULTURE IN MAJOR WORLD AREAS, CA. 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continent</th>
<th>Per Cent of Economically Active Males Engaged in Agriculture</th>
<th>Per Cent of Population in Cities 100,000-plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORLD</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America and Caribbean</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results are of course what one would expect, but it is worth having figures to show the precise extent of the association between economic development and urbanization. Another method of showing the relationship is by a correlation coefficient. As of 1950, the (Pearsonian) correlation between degree of industrialization and degree of urbanization, as measured by our indices, was .86, taking the countries and territories of the world as our units.

It is plain, then, that urbanization is unequally distributed in the world. The achievement of high levels of urbanization anywhere in the world had to wait for the industrial revolution. This remarkable transformation had its rise in one part of the world, western Europe, and thence spread to other parts
as industrialism spread. With the exception of Japan, the centers of urbanization today are the places where industrialization has gone hand-in-hand with the expansion of European civilization. In many instances, the spread of this kind of civilization has embraced "new" areas of vast extent and sparse native populations, such as North and South America and Australia. The urbanism of Europe was directly transplanted to these new areas, so that they became highly urbanized without acquiring overall dense populations. They were not hampered by the necessity of a slow evolution from densely settled peasant-agrarianism to modern industrialism. Thus we find that some of the most urbanized regions of the world are among the most sparsely settled, whereas some of the least urbanized are among the most densely settled.

The Share of Cities and City People in Underdeveloped Areas

The concentration of urbanization in industrial areas should not lead us to believe that most of the cities and most of the city people are found in these areas, as is commonly thought. The truth is that three-fourths of the world's population lives in pre-industrial countries. Although these countries are mainly rural, they are all urbanized to some degree because of the commercial impact of the industrial nations. Consequently, we find that the underdeveloped countries contain as many cities as do the industrial countries, as Table 3 shows. The countries having more than half of their occupied males in agriculture, forestry and fishing (the underdeveloped nations), contain 463 large cities. From the last column of Table 3 it can be seen that the underdeveloped countries have more people (160 million) living in cities of 100,000 or more than do the industrialized nations (155 million).

The same general finding can be shown in another way. If, instead of grouping countries according to their degree of agriculturalism, we group them according to their degree of urbanization, it turns out that the more rural countries have as many large cities and as many dwellers in large cities as the more urbanized ones.

It becomes clear that the science of cities must concern itself just as much with underdeveloped countries as with advanced countries. Too much of the past study and interpretation of cities has ignored this simple fact. Deductions concerning "the city" have been made principally on the basis of American and European cases, embracing at best less than half of the universe being discussed.
Urbanization and Agricultural Density

The point has already been made that no relation exists between degree of urbanization and average density of population. Some of the underdeveloped and hence least urbanized countries are among the most densely settled, and some of the most highly developed are among the most sparsely settled; and vice versa. There is, however, a relationship — a negative one — between urbanization and what we call agricultural density (the number of males occupied with agriculture, hunting and forestry per square mile of cultivated land), as exhibited in Table 4. Although this negative relationship seems to affront common sense (for we might think that cities demand more agricultural products and hence require a dense population in rural areas), the reason for it is apparent upon reflection.3

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per Cent of Population</th>
<th>Agricultural Males per Square Mile of Agricultural Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in Cities 100,000-plus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 - 9.9</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 19.9</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29.9</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-plus</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agricultural males are arbitrarily defined as those gainfully occupied in farming, hunting, fishing, and forestry. Agricultural land is defined as including land under crops, lying fallow, and in orchards. In a few cases the proportion of fishermen or herdsmen is so large as to make the ratio meaningless. In such cases adjustments have been made to approximate the actual man-land ratio in agriculture. One reason for lumping farmers with fishermen, etc., is mainly because the figures are so often grouped that way in census.

The oft-condemned "depopulation" of rural areas is therefore a sign of economic modernization, the growth of cities a boon to progress. This statement is not only true of densely settled agrarian countries such as those of southeast Asia but also true of sparsely settled ones such as those of central and east Africa. The latter, despite a low overall density, have a high ratio of people to land under cultivation. Their main advantage often lies in the

fact that an increase in the land under cultivation is possible on a big scale, so that rural-urban migration does not have to absorb the entire surplus population released by the modernization of agriculture.

The Growth of Urbanization in Underdeveloped Areas

The facts of the current situation — the positive correlation between urbanization and industrialization and the negative association between urbanization and agricultural density — suggest what one might expect to find historically. The present concentration of urbanization (as distinct from cities) in the advanced nations is almost wholly a product of the last 150 years. In 1800 the population in large cities was distributed over the earth in much the same fashion as the general population. With the rise and spread of industrialism in the nineteenth century, the European peoples, as we noted, rapidly and markedly increased their degree of urbanization. This hiatus between the advanced and non-advanced parts of the world, however, is but a temporary phenomenon — a lag due to the time required for the geographical and cross-cultural spread of a radically new type of economic and social organization. As the great transformation has been completed in the most advanced countries, as these countries have achieved a high degree of urbanization, the rate of growth of their cities has begun to slacken. Indeed, this has noticeably happened in the twentieth century in countries such as Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United States (see Figures 1 and 2). It is bound to happen, because as the proportion of the population living in cities becomes greater and greater, the chance of maintaining the rate of increase in that proportion becomes less and less. Furthermore, we know that the growth of cities has been mainly a result of rural-urban migration, which has contributed at times far more to urban numbers than the natural increase in cities could ever contribute. As the rural proportion declines to a small fraction of the total population, the cities have an ever smaller pool of people to draw on for the maintenance of growth rates.

The charts show the steady decline in the rate of urbanization in the most advanced countries in recent decades. But at the same time that this has been happening in industrial areas, the rate of urbanization has been increasing in most underdeveloped regions, as the charts also show. There is thus going on today a balancing of accounts, an incipient evening out of urbanization throughout the world. As a result the next fifty or one hundred years may find the city population once again distributed roughly in proportion to the world’s total population. If so, it will mark the end of a gigantic cycle — the urbanization of the world.

The rapidity of urbanization in most of the pre-industrial areas is surprising. Only in such out-of-the-way places as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and some African territories has urban expansion failed to make much headway, and these countries are few in number and small in total population. As a group, the underdeveloped countries, with 7 per cent of their people in 100,000-plus cities and 11 per cent in 20,000-plus cities in 1950, have moved some distance toward a high degree of urbanization. The general picture is therefore one of fast urbanization comparable to that experienced at earlier periods in the now industrialized nations. Since the more recently industrialized countries have tended to urbanize faster once they started than the older countries did, there is reason to believe that the future pace of the currently underdeveloped regions may be fast indeed. Should these regions achieve the rapid rate of urbanization experienced either by Germany or Japan, they will as a group become highly urbanized (with more than 15 per cent of their population
FIGURE 1

GROWTH OF THE PROPORTION OF POPULATION IN CITIES OF 100,000 PLUS
FOR THE WORLD AND FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1800-1951.

GROWTH OF THE PROPORTION OF POPULATION IN CITIES OF 20,000 PLUS
FOR THE WORLD AND FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1800-1951.
in large cities) within the next fifty years.

The pace of urbanization in the backward areas shows that they are anything but static. Sometimes, when one looks at the myriad difficulties and inefficiencies in the pre-industrial countries, when it appears that immemorial customs still prevail and that there is a vicious circle of poverty breeding poverty, one is tempted to think that these societies are static. But the data on trends of city growth and urbanization show them to possess highly dynamic attributes. Since urbanization is not an isolated culture trait but is a function of the total economy, its rapid growth indicates that fundamental changes are occurring at a rate sufficient to transform these pre-industrial societies within a few decades.

These generalizations concerning the underdeveloped countries as a whole seem well worth pondering. They can be documented by statistical analysis of a comparative kind. At the same time, anyone will recognize that the pre-industrial countries are not all alike. Some are more urbanized than others. Some differ in demography, economy, and society from others. It therefore becomes instructive to consider particular countries which represent types of cases—types that may recur in various underdeveloped countries but are not found everywhere within the pre-industrial category. Accordingly, we have picked out a few countries for particular analysis.

In this attempt to analyze briefly some particular cases, two things should be borne in mind. First, as one would expect, our statistics for underdeveloped areas are not as good as those for other areas. They are, however, as good as those we have for industrial nations when they were at a comparable stage of development. As we move back in time the data become poorer, so that long historical series on the underdeveloped countries are quite scarce and our selection of illustrative countries is narrowed. Second, from a scientific point of view little can be learned from a particular case without the benefit of comparative analysis. When a nation is described as a "type" with reference to urbanization it can be so described only in terms of its similarities and contrasts to other countries. Our case analyses are therefore undertaken with comparative statistical analysis in the background, as will become evident.

The particular areas selected for brief presentation below are India, an old agrarian country with a moderate rate of urbanization; Egypt, an overurbanized and disorganized agrarian country; and central and west Africa, a region of revolutionary new urbanization. The study of these regions in comparative terms raises some fundamental questions about the dynamics of urbanization.

The Case of India

Since pre-industrial countries are not all "underdeveloped" to the same degree, one of the first questions to be asked about any one of them is how its situation compares with that of other countries. India, with respect to our index of industrialization, stands at about the midpoint of the array. Fifty-one per cent of the rest of the world's population lives in countries more industrialized than India and 49 per cent in countries less industrialized. When each

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(4) This section on India is drawn from Kingsley Davis, "Social and Demographic Aspects of Economic Development in India," to be published soon as part of a symposium sponsored by the Social Science Research Council.
country is treated as a unit regardless of population, only 43 per cent of the countries and colonies of the world are more industrialized than India. With 68.9 per cent of her male population dependent on agriculture in 1951, India is definitely in the underdeveloped category, but she is somewhat more advanced than the average country in that category.

But now an interesting question arises. Modernization has different aspects, and if indices can be found which approximately measure these aspects, we can find in what ways a country is more developed and in what ways less developed than its general position would indicate. In other words, in addition to comparing different countries with reference to a particular index, we can compare several indices within the same country. By way of illustration, Table 5 shows that India seems far behind on literacy and considerably behind on per capita income and the reduction of agricultural density. She is best off in terms of occupational structure (our measure of industrialization) and in terms of urbanization. Thus we may say that there is some tendency for urbanization to run ahead of other aspects of development in India, but not noticeably except with respect to educational development.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIA'S RELATIVE POSITION ON SELECTED INDICES</th>
<th>Per Cent of World's Population in Countries Ahead of India</th>
<th>Per Cent of Countries Ahead of India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-agricultural employment /a</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural density /b</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization /c</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy /d</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita income /e</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a/ Percentage of occupied males who are engaged in agriculture, 1947 or near that date.

b/ Number of gainfully occupied males in agriculture per square mile or agricultural land (i.e., land under crops or lying fallow). Dates same as (a). A low agricultural density is taken as a sign of efficiency, and hence being ahead of India would mean having a lower agricultural density.

c/ Percentage of population living in places of 20,000 or more, 1950.

d/ Percentage of population age 10 or over able to read. Dates same as in (a).

e/ Not based on world as a whole, but on 70 countries which include 90 per cent of the world’s population. United Nations, National and Per Capita Incomes, Seventy Countries – 1949.

1/ Except for per capita national income, all data were compiled and processed by Division of Population Research, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University.

Without attempting here to explain the particular character of India’s situation which these indices point up — which is a significant problem in understanding economic change in pre-industrial countries — let us say that even though urbanization tends to be slightly more advanced than her total economy and society would lead us to estimate, it is still modest in world terms. In
1951, the country had 6.8 per cent of its population in cities of 100,000 or more, as compared to 13.1 per cent for the world as a whole. India manifests less than half the urbanization found in Brazil (13.9 per cent in 100,000-plus cities in 1950) and only one-fourth that found in Chile (26.0 per cent in 1950).

The present percentage of India's population living in large cities is about the same as that of the United States in 1855. But urbanization is proceeding somewhat more slowly in India than in the United States at that time, and it went much more slowly in the early periods. From 1820 to 1860 in the United States the average gain per decade in the proportion living in large cities was 63 per cent. In India from 1891 to 1951 it was 22 per cent. In spite of the fact that progress can be faster the more recently it occurs, this is not proving true in India, at least so far as urbanization is concerned. This suggests that there have been dampers on India's development which did not operate in America in its early history. As a result of the unequal rates of development at similar stages of urbanization, India has fallen further behind than it was. Whereas in 1891 India was about 55 years behind the United States in this matter, by 1931 she was over 90 years behind. After 1931, however, India's rate of urbanization increased markedly, almost equalling the United States gain at similar levels. How long she will continue to do so is hard to say, and if she does, it may be a consequence of "over-urbanization" such as seems to occur occasionally in other densely peopled agrarian countries. This possibility is suggested by the apparently static character of India's occupational structure, for the proportion of occupied males in agriculture has shown virtually no sign of change for several decades.

Egypt: An Over-Urbanized Country

That there is, on a world-wide basis, a high correlation (.86) between urbanization and our index of economic development has already been mentioned. About one-fourth of the variation in urbanization from one country to another, however, cannot be explained by variation in the degree of non-agriculturalism. If the relationship between the two variables is represented in the form of a regression curve, certain countries are found to be off the line to a significant extent. One of these is Egypt, which has far more urbanization than its degree of economic development would lead us to expect. In this sense Egypt is "over-urbanized," and since this is a condition found also in certain over underdeveloped areas (notably Greece and Korea, and probably Lebanon), an examination of the case offers some clues to the dynamics of urbanization in underdeveloped areas under certain conditions.

How far out of line Egypt is can be seen from the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>100,000-plus</th>
<th>20,000-plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland, 1950</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, 1947</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden, 1945</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, 1946</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) This section is drawn heavily from Robert Parke, Jr., "Over-urbanization in Egypt," a paper read at the annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society April 3, 1954. Mr. Parke's work on Egypt was developed in the context of the urban research program at Columbia University.
By no stretch of the imagination is Egypt as industrialized as the other three countries in the list, yet she is nearly as urbanized as Switzerland and is more urbanized on the 100,000+ level than Sweden or France. Indeed, the proportion urban in the 1947 Egyptian census is so high that some suspicion attaches to the figure, but even if a correction factor is introduced to compensate for overenumeration of the large city population, Egypt is far more urbanized than its industrial position would require. Furthermore, this condition is not of recent origin (i.e., not found in the 1947 census alone) but has characterized the country for at least forty years, as Table 6 shows. The overurbanization is therefore real, and it has increased with time.

Table 6
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL URBANIZATION IN EGYPT,
1907-1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Males in Non-Agricultural Activities</th>
<th>Per Cent of Population in Cities 100,000-plus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[a/\] The expected figure is derived from the regression equation in which the proportion of non-agricultural male employment is the independent variable and the proportion in large cities is the dependent variable. The compilation of the necessary data and the derivation of the equation are mainly the work of Hilda Hertz.

\[b/\] If a correction is made for over-enumeration, the figure comes out to 17.6%.

\[1/\] The table was conceived and worked out by Robert Parke, Jr., in the unpublished paper cited in the text.

In looking for an explanation of this situation, one has to take into account the fact that Egypt's cultivated rural area is, to an extraordinary degree, densely settled and impoverished. The density is a product of rapid population growth for a century and a half and the inability of the economy to expand its non-agricultural sector proportionately. The poverty is due to the same factors, plus the familiar pattern of tenancy associated with large landholdings.

(6) Charles Issawi, a well known expert on Egypt, says: "When broken down the census returns show an abnormal increase in Alexandria and even more in Cairo. It is probable that many inhabitants of these cities filled their forms wrongly in the hope of getting extra ration cards," "Population and Wealth in Egypt," Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 27 (January 1949), 100. Issawi does not say, however, what he means by "abnormal." He gives no statistical analysis to demonstrate overenumeration.

(7) Ibid., pp. 98-107. See also Clyde V. Kiser, "The Demographic Position of Egypt" in Milbank Memorial Fund, Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth, New York: 1944.
whose absentee owners live in the cities. As the result of the impoverishment of the rural masses and the absence from the countryside of those who utilize the agricultural surplus, a curious thing has happened: nearly everybody who is not actually farming, the land has gotten out and gone to the cities. Mr. Parke, on the basis of the 1947 census, has estimated that only 10 per cent of the occupied males living in rural places — i.e., villages and towns of less than 5,000 — are engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. For 1950 in Puerto Rico the figure is 23 per cent (except that rural is there defined as places of less than 2500, which makes the contrast sharper), and in France the figure is estimated at 50 per cent. One cannot avoid feeling that in Egypt the social and economic structure has so deprived the cultivator that he has little or nothing beyond bare subsistence. He cannot command much by way of services or handicraft products, and consequently the people who furnish such goods and services have gone to the cities. In the cities the non-agricultural producer can at least find the people — landowners, government workers, and middle classes — who drain the countryside of its surplus; and it is to them that he looks for support. The city therefore gathers to itself practically everybody who does not actually have to work the land to get a living.

Not only do productive non-agriculturalists come to the cities in Egypt, but also a great many unproductive people. Whereas the cities in industrial countries normally have a disproportionate share of people in the working ages, the Egyptian cities fail to exhibit this characteristic. They do, to an astonishing degree, the same age-sex structure as the total population. This is particularly strange since normally in an oriental city the sex ratio is heavily distorted in favor of males. Since in Muslim culture women do not usually participate in non-agricultural economic activities, the normal city sex ratio in Egypt, along with an unusually high proportion of children, means that the inactive population in the cities is extremely high. The data indicate, according to Parke, that about 92 per cent of women aged 15 and over in Cairo and Alexandria are economically inactive.

Such facts show that the densely settled and impoverished countryside in Egypt is pushing people into the cities because they have no other alternative. When they get into the cities it is perhaps harder for the government to let them starve, and they run some chance of picking up some crumbs from the wealthy who inhabit only the cities. Issawi has presented evidence showing a sharp decline in the per capita consumption of staple items in Egypt from 1920 to 1937. Much of the migration to the cities seems therefore to be a refugee migration from the countryside where increased population, diminished size of holdings, and absentee landlord exactions have gradually squeezed out families by the thousands.

These facts are sufficient to account for the overurbanization which we found to characterize Egypt. That they do so was found by certain calculations performed by Parke. He first assumed that the non-agriculturalists in Egypt were distributed as between the urban and rural sectors in the same ratio as in Puerto Rico. The effect of this assumption was to reduce the population in large cities by 13 per cent. Hence, the concentration of non-agriculturalists and of the inactive population in cities would virtually account for the observed overurbanization in Egypt.

The Egyptian case gains significance by virtue of the fact that some other underdeveloped countries exhibit the same phenomenon. T. O. Wilkinson,
working in the comparative urban research program at Columbia University, has shown that in Korea after Japanese occupation in 1910, economic development lagged far behind urbanization. Korean city growth "was more the result of the 'push' from a hard-pressed rural economy than of the 'pull' from expanding opportunities in urban areas." After the departure of the Japanese, this tendency was increased.

During the five-year post-World-War-II period covered in available South Korean census data, urbanization continued at a rapid rate, but even the limited economic base for city growth provided by Japanese activity had disappeared. That 17.2 per cent of South Korea's people in 1949 were in incorporated cities can be accounted for almost wholly by the fact that cities functioned as refuges for migrants from the poverty of rural regions and for thousands of repatriates returning to Korea following World War II. An agricultural density approaching 300 per square mile, in addition to the breakdown of rural food-rationing systems, strengthened the tendency for cityward movement. The relief organizations and the employment related to interim military government were almost exclusively in cities.

A similar tendency toward overurbanization seems to have occurred in Greece and may occur in the future in India and some other underdeveloped areas if the underlying conditions arise. One must therefore raise the question of what its significance is for economic development.

One's first tendency is to condemn such overurbanization as artificial and perhaps harmful to economic growth. One frequently hears the old plaint that people are being turned off the land and are drifting unhappily to the metropolis, and the temptation is to say that the process should be stopped. The use of the word "overurbanization" may connote such an evaluative interpretation. But the term as used here has only a statistical meaning, with no overtone of evaluation intended. From the standpoint of future economic growth, three considerations stand out. First, overurbanization surely has its limits. It is possible for city growth to get ahead of general modernization, but not very far ahead for very long. If there is economic stagnation, urban growth itself must ultimately cease. In Egypt we can expect, then, that either the rate of urbanization will fall off sharply or industrialization will gain a new impetus. Second, overurbanization may have some effect in stimulating economic growth. Insofar as the city represents an efficient locale for non-agricultural production (as we believe it does), the accumulation of people in cities represents at least a potential setting for enhanced output. Also, in the process of modernizing agriculture, the more people who can be moved off the land, the better. Third, it is primarily in the cities that the leadership and the mobile following for revolutionary activities are to be found. Overurbanization, as we have analyzed it, is well calculated to provoke the maximum discontent in the population. Faced with idle, impoverished, and rootless urban masses, the government is forced to take drastic action or to allow itself to be displaced by a new revolutionary group. Since economic development is often hindered by outmoded institutional and political arrangements, the role of urbanization in fostering revolutionary activity (whether communist or not) can be said to be


(10) Ibid., p. 35.
potentially favorable to change. It should be emphasized, however, that we are speaking of potentialities. Whether or not these potentialities are in fact realized depends on other factors in the situation. Urbanization, and particularly overurbanization, is only one of several major variables in industrial change, and so it is wise to avoid the appearance of determinism with reference to its role.

Revolutionary New Urbanization in Africa

In cases such as India, Egypt, Korea and Greece, we are confronted with countries that have long experienced the phenomenon of cities and which have old and complex civilizations. In central and west Africa, on the other hand, we find ourselves in a totally different kind of underdeveloped region — one in which primitive tribal life, completely rural in character, has been the dominant mode of existence until very recently. It is still a region of unlettered rurality, its people getting their subsistence mainly by hoe agriculture, by herding, or by hunting and fishing.

Yet into this still heavily primitive region is now being thrust an extremely rapid and patently modern city development. The urbanization that is rapidly taking place is not the urbanization of the late medieval period in Europe, not the urbanization of the 18th and 19th centuries; it is rather the urbanization of the 20th century. This sudden juxtaposition of 20th-century cities and extremely primitive cultures (virtually stone-age in their organization and technology) gives rise in some respects to a sharper rural-urban contrast than can be found anywhere else in the world. It is the contrast between Neolithic cultures on the one hand and industrial culture on the other, not mitigated by intervening centuries of sociocultural evolution but juxtaposed and mixed all at once.

It follows that the flow of migrants from countryside to city in Africa corresponds to a rapid transition telescoping several millennia into a short span. The social disorganization to which it gives rise is probably greater than that ever before experienced by urban populations. The native coming to the city cannot immediately divest himself of his tribal customs and allegiances, his superstitions and taboos; yet these are fantastically inappropriate to a modern urban milieu. Nor can he acquire suddenly the knowledge and habits necessary to make city life reasonable and workable. The result is a weird and chaotic mixture which gives to the average African city an unreal, tense, jangling quality.

Yet urbanization is probably going ahead faster in this region than anywhere else in the world. It has to be recalled that great parts of middle Africa were not "discovered" by Europeans until the latter half of the last century, and many parts have been opened to economic penetration only since World War I. As late as 1900, for example, the Katanga area of the Belgian

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(11) It has been shown, for example, that communist revolutions are largely implemented by the urban intellectual leadership and not by discontented peasants. The urban leadership is needed to mobilize and direct the revolutionary energy which peasant discontent supplies. See Morris Watnick, "The Appeal of Communism to the Peoples of Underdeveloped Areas," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1 (March 1952), 22-36. This article was apparently reprinted in Bert F. Hoselitz (ed.) The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 152-72.
Congo, an area now known to be fabulously rich in mineral deposits, was precariously held by a few isolated military posts which could barely deal with rebellious natives. The site of the present capital of this area, Elisabethville, was not chosen until 1910. By 1912 it already had 8,000 inhabitants; by 1948, over 100,000. Diversifying its industry, stimulating a surrounding modernized agricultural development, Elisabethville today is still growing fast. The growth of other cities has been similarly recent and in many instances even more spectacular. The capital of the Belgian Congo, Leopoldville, had a population of about 34,000 in 1930. Twenty years later, in 1950, the number of its inhabitants had increased approximately seven times, rising to 211,000. The town was said in 1951 to cover an area equal to a quarter of that of Paris, with sixty miles of streets and roads. In a few more years its population should reach half a million. But the history of Leopoldville is by no means unique. As Table 7 shows, there are several other cities in Negro Africa which have had a comparable rate of growth. Some of them have quadrupled in population since World War II.

### Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population (in 000's)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accra</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazzaville</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakar</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisabethville</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopoldville</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on these cities are derived from so many different sources that it seems too unwieldy to list them. Few are based on genuine censuses, exceptions being Accra and Lagos. The dates are often a year or two different from those listed in the caption.

The reasons for the rapid growth of cities in this great region are varied. Penetrated by modern economic enterprise only recently, the region has more virtually unexploited primary resources than any other major area of the world. The first notable spurt in the exploitation of these resources came in connection with the demands created by World War I. But the demand during and after World War II was even greater. Both agricultural products (palm oil, cocoa, coffee, pyrethrum, peanuts, cotton, sisal, rubber, hides, timber) and mineral products (tin, copper, gold, diamonds, bauxite, uranium) commanded high prices, so that it was worthwhile to expand their exploitation with modern scientific techniques at the most rapid pace possible. In addition, in connection with World War II, there was apparently a flight of private capital from the politically insecure countries of Europe to the potentially rich colonies of Africa. Not only private but also public capital came. The African colonies had proved to have great strategic value for the free countries of the
world, both in war and in the struggle for economic survival. Hence the metropolitan nations were anxious to invest public capital to develop and strengthen them. America was willing to help through Marshall Aid, Mutual Security, Point IV, and private investment. International agencies, such as the World Bank, also lent a hand. As a result of all these funds available for investment in primary resources — resources capable of a rapidly expanding exploitation and fetching good prices on the world market — the economy of Negro Africa moved ahead rapidly. The towns and cities of the region, most of them new, grew with fantastic speed because the invading economic enterprise depended on urban facilities which previously had not existed. The investment of huge capital funds, the organization of business enterprise, the strengthening of governmental control, the mobilization of trained personnel — all were focused in the new urban headquarters. Vast new housing projects for Africans and for Europeans, for public and for private employees, were undertaken; large new administrative office buildings, hotels, stores, storage houses were erected; new utility plants, new light industries, improved harbors, and new amenities were installed. The visitor to these cities at any time from 1945 to 1954 would see a rate of new construction eclipsing that of American boomtowns in their rosiest periods.

But the rapidity of urban growth today should not lead one to think of the region as highly urbanized. On the contrary, it was so profoundly rural only a short time ago that the recent growth of cities has not yet brought the percentage of urban population to a point of parity with even other underdeveloped areas. The present towns and cities are still urban islands in a sea of rurality.

Furthermore, even though the cities represent mainly an importation by Europeans, their populations are European to only a small extent, being overwhelmingly African. This preponderance of the African means that the cities are composed chiefly of people who only yesterday were living in primitive cultures and who, indeed, are still attached to those cultures. As a result, urbanization achieves in this region an extreme role as a stimulant of social change. The small European populations form the organizing and directing core. Under their stimulus the natives flock from the bush to the city. But they often do not stay. They generally return sooner or later to their tribal home, either for a visit or to stay permanently, being replaced by others while they are away. Thus the effect of the city is diffused outward through the primitive countryside, so that the whole texture of tribal life is being broken down.

What will be the result of this process of rapid and revolutionary urbanization in central and west Africa? On the whole the prospect for complete and early modernization would seem better than in India and Egypt, because the area possesses huge potential resources and a relatively sparse population. The rest of the world, crowded and hungry for industrial raw materials, needs these resources. Thus there is every indication that, barring a world catastrophe, the demand for Africa's primary products will increase and that the region will continue its fast pace of city building. The efficiencies created by wholesale importation of urban and industrial technology will probably provide an adequate economic base for a quick transition to modern conditions. Doubtless, as the tribal peoples recover from the initial shock of quick and massive contact with twentieth-century culture, their natural increase will be great and population will grow for a while. But the urbanization process may be so rapid that, before overwhelmingly dense rural populations are built up, fertility will start declining again and the natural increase will be lowered to manageable proportions. In other words, there is a chance for urbanization to acquire an early predominance as it has done in prosperous new areas such as Aus-
tralia or Argentina rather than be bogged down in a swamp of densely settled peasant-agriculturalism as in most of Asia.

Our brief analysis of African urbanization has been mainly confined to the middle and western part of the continent where the Europeans are mostly a small directing element, not permanently settled but still attached to their homelands. The case is somewhat different in the Portuguese and Spanish territories where European contact is older, where the cultural differences are less, and where urbanization has not been so recent or so rapid. The case is also different in East Africa where a local northwest European population has made its permanent home and is thus in competition with the native for land and for political advantage. But it still remains true that most of Negro Africa, the world's most rural region, is yielding rapidly to urbanization, and that in spite of (perhaps because of) the disorganization of this twentieth-century intrusion into Neolithic culture, the region stands a chance of shortcircuiting much of the painful evolution that the older partially urbanized civilizations will have to go through before they achieve an urban-industrial society with a commensurate level of living.

Conclusion: The Role of Cities in Economic Development

Behind much of our reasoning is the assumption that urbanization is not only an excellent index of economic development and social modernization but also itself a stimulus to such change. This assumption should not be taken for granted. It should be examined, and in comparative urban research we have an opportunity to do so. Space does not permit a full treatment of the matter here, but the line of reasoning may be briefly intimated as a fitting conclusion to this paper.

Basically, the city is an efficient mode of human settlement because, with great numbers concentrated in a small area, it minimizes one of the greatest obstacles to human production — what Haig has called "the friction of space." This achievement is not possible without a high degree of urbanization (i.e., not possible in a predominantly agricultural or non-industrial economy) because by their very nature such activities as hunting and tillage require a large area in relation to number of workers. In non-agricultural production, however, land is not a factor in production but merely a site. Consequently, production can be concentrated in small space; and when this is done in a city, a great variety of goods and services can be supplied by numerous specialized producers whose mutual interdependence is facilitated by the possibility of ready and cheap transport and communication within the city. The city thus becomes, in essence, one great factory.

The gain in efficiency thus achieved, though enormous, is not without its limits. The main limitation is that the city is not self-contained. It must export and import to live. It must export either goods or services, or both, to its rural hinterland, and it must usually export to other cities as well. It therefore requires other means of overcoming friction of space than the sheer fact of close settlement within its own boundaries. This is why adequate transportation is indispensable to a high degree of urbanization. Insofar as the technology of rural-urban and of inter-urban transport and communication is itself an urban product, the city becomes something of a self-generating system, for

(12) An attempt to set forth a full theory of the role of cities in economic development will be found in the writers' book, The Pattern of World Urbanization, soon to be published.
it is producing the means for ever greater urbanization. The steamboat, railroad, and airplane, by facilitating long-distance transport, made it possible for individual cities to become larger and for a greater proportion of a country's population to live in them. Improved transport made it easier for rural people to migrate to the cities; and the cities, by removing excess rural manpower, by stimulating the demand for agricultural products, and by furnishing capital and new organizational principles and techniques for rural enterprise, contributed to the modernization of agriculture itself.

The efficiency of the city is not limited to the economic sphere. It also makes possible a greater accumulation of capital and personnel for purposes of formal education, public health, science, art, etc. Doubtless much is wasted on excrescences of religious superstition and frivolous fashion and display, but the possibility of specialization in different branches of knowledge, of the accumulation of libraries and the exchange of ideas, exists because of the character of the city.

The requirements of urban living force innovations which those in the countryside, if left to themselves, would never make. The fact of high density in small space gives rise to traffic and sanitary difficulties, to housing problems, to crime conditions, to organized special interests. All of these have to be dealt with in one way or another, and the innovations made sometimes give rise to new patterns of political and social control which can be diffused to the rural population. Furthermore, the competition for space and for special advantage within the urban milieu gives an advantage to individual innovation, to rationalistic calculation, and to individualism — all of which tends to stimulate a faster pace of cultural change than is likely to be seen in a peasant setting.

All told, then, the city makes its own peculiar contribution to the process of economic development. It is no accident that urbanization and industrialization have gone hand-in-hand. The appearance of rapid urbanization in underdeveloped areas is therefore both a sign of change already under way and an augury of future change. Its stimulating role is possibly more hampered in well-established agrarian civilizations such as those of India and Egypt and least hampered in primitive but potentially rich areas such as central and west Africa, but its effect in any case would seem to be substantial.

As yet only a small part of the world has become highly urbanized, but that small part is dominant over the rest and is diffusing its urban pattern widely. As the whole world begins to become highly urbanized, human society can be expected to become more dynamic than in the past. The process of urbanization itself must come to an end when nearly all people live in urban aggregations, but the forms of life and the ecological patterns within these aggregates will doubtless continue to change and the innovating force of urbanism will continue to modify culture and society.

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Hilda Hertz Golden
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APPENDIX

The World Urban Resources Index

The World Urban Resources Index is in essence a systematically arranged file in which quantitative data for all cities of the world of over 100,000 inhabitants are transcribed and used for research purposes. By a logical and readily accessible arrangement of the file, quick reference can be made to any particular city or group of cities, or to any given aspect of all cities, or to a limited class of cities. Statistical handling of the data is facilitated by the use of punch-cards containing standardized figures, and also by the use of punch-cards referring to bibliographical sources.

The aim of the Index is to gather and process not only current information but also historical series. The historical material facilitates research on comparative trends and gives a basis for estimating the present situation and possible future trends. In general the data are included in their raw form, so as to permit the maximum amount of analytical manipulation; but in certain cases where it is known in advance that given indices, ratios, or rates will be useful, these are computed and entered as items in the file. It goes without saying that special effort has to be made to assure comparability. For this reason, before any type of data — say, matters of the industrial composition of the labor force — definition, classification, availability, estimation, etc., have to be gone into carefully.

In addition to cities over the world, the Index also gathers certain statistical information on the countries, colonies, and territories in which the cities are found. Such information is essential not only for measuring the degree of urbanization in whole populations, but also for studying the interrelation between cities and their hinterlands and between city growth and other processes of economic development.

The Index makes it possible to treat cities as a general class of phenomena, of which particular groups of cities, whether of a region, a nation, or a type, form a special manifestation. It provides us with some knowledge of the universe of the world’s large cities, from which samples can be drawn either through simple list-sampling or stratified sampling; and it enables us to designate sub-universes which we may wish to sample for particular purposes.

The world-wide coverage of the Index permits analyses of cultural and regional differences in the structure, growth, location, and correlates of cities. At the same time, it affords the analyst an opportunity to discover the essential and universal elements of urbanism wherever found, regardless of cultural differences.

With the data of the Index it becomes possible to find correlations not only between urbanization and other socio-economic trends, but also between different city traits. Such correlations offer a chance of greatly expanding our grasp of the dynamics of urban aggregates, and they also facilitate the preparation of systematic estimates to fill gaps where information is lacking. These estimates, clearly labeled as such, can go back into the Index and form part of its total body of organized knowledge.

The development of the Index has been recent. Work was initiated in the autumn of 1951. Since the development of such an instrumentality must necessarily proceed gradually in a step-by-step manner, there is much that has to be done before the project attains its optimum productivity in terms of research.
For example, one of the first tasks was that of compiling an accurate list of all cities now having 100,000 or more inhabitants, which gave us our "universe of cities." Another early task was that of compiling certain basic data on the countries and territories in which large cities are found — a task made easier by previous work done at Columbia University in connection with a project on population and international relations.

Next came the process of deciding what blocs of data should be put into the Index first.1 Among the aspects of cities which it seemed feasible to process at the start were the following:

(a) Identifying and locational data, including eleven items;
(b) Demographic data, including total populations, area, age-sex structure, and vital rates; and
(c) Industrial composition of the labor force.

In addition, the plan calls for gathering material on some ten other aspects of cities, including land use, education, religio-ethnic groups, and governmental structure.

Except for identifying data and a few other items, it turns out, as expected, that information on any particular aspect of cities is not available for the entire universe of large places. Such a limitation does not, however, preclude useful analysis. Much information can be obtained from a sample, provided we know something about the universe from which the sample is taken. Since some data are either available or estimated for all cities of 100,000 or more persons, the position of any particular sample can be determined with respect to these items, and thus allowances can be made for sample bias, or a new sample can be drawn so as to diminish bias.

The intention from the start has been to conduct research on the basis of the Index without waiting for the Index to be "complete." The assumption is that such research is not only of value in itself but also contributes to the improvement and development of the Index. To date a number of reports for private circulation have emerged, two articles have appeared, and two longer studies are being readied for publication.2 The present paper gives some of the results of our comparative work which bear on urbanization and economic development in pre-industrial areas.

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1 No attempt has been made to determine in advance all of the kinds of material to be included, because the Index, by its very nature, is capable of indefinite expansion as the need arises. The sole question, therefore, was the choice of which statistical information should be processed in the early stages and which should be postponed until later.

2 A list of unpublished reports is obtainable from the authors. By way of publications, see Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz, "The World Distribution of Urbanization," in Proceedings of the International Statistical Institute, 1951 (New Delhi, India); and T. O. Wilkinson, "The Pattern of Korean Urban Growth," Rural Sociology, 19 (March 1954), 32-38. A forthcoming publication by Natalie Rogoff will include two studies, one on "The Universe of Cities" and the other on "The Age-Sex Structure of Cities." A book by Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz, The Pattern of World Urbanization, will be published soon by MacMillan.
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE RATE OF URBANIZATION: A COMMENT ON THE PAPER BY DAVIS AND GOLDEN

This conference has as its purpose the exploration of the role of cities in economic development and cultural change. The paper by Kingsley Davis and Hilda Hertz Golden explores this problem area by empirically examining the relationship of urbanization and industrialization based on data from the World Urban Resources Index at Columbia University. Three illuminating case studies on urbanization in India, Egypt and East Africa also are presented. The comparative or cross-cultural point of view properly governs the analysis. It is, in fact, the absence of data even comparable to that found in the World Urban Resources Index of Columbia University which limits the discussant of this paper. The rapid growth of that index is to be encouraged since it will facilitate comparative research on the social organization of cities such as that considered in this paper.

Davis and Golden begin by observing that the science of cities must concern itself just as much with underdeveloped countries as with advanced countries since the degree of urbanization in a given country can vary independently of the absolute number of people living in cities. In fact, while the underdeveloped countries of the world have less urbanization than the advanced areas, there are more people living in cities of 100,000 or more in underdeveloped countries than in industrialized nations. The present concentration of urbanization, as distinct from cities, in the advanced nations of the world Davis and Golden attribute to the rise and spread of industrialism. This hiatus between the advanced and non-advanced parts of the world, they hold, is a temporary phenomenon however, due to the time required for the spread of the industrial modes of organization. In the long run it is stated, the city population distributes itself roughly in proportion to the world's total population. The less advanced countries are now in the process of moving the world toward this equilibrium state.

Given this general framework for studying the relationship of cities to economic development and cultural change, it follows that the causal factors involved in the rise and growth of cities in a particular country are not necessarily those which will explain a high degree of urbanization. By definition, the presence of any city means some urbanization in a country. The paper presumably seeks to explain then, not why there are cities, but why some countries have a high proportion of their population living in cities while others do not and how this level of urbanization is related to economic growth and cultural change in the country.

Following this general outline in the beginning of the paper, it is confusing to find that the causal analysis in the concluding section of the paper deals with the role of cities in inducing economic development or modernization rather than with how urbanization induces economic growth and cultural change. Here the level of analysis shifts to factors attached to a city and its population. Basically the factors discussed here are the following: (a) the city is an efficient mode of human settlement since it reduces the friction of space and becomes one great factory; (b) through transportation the city achieves urbanization of a hinterland; (c) the city increases efficiency in the accumulation of capital and personnel for purposes of formal education, public health, science, art, etc.; (d) urban living forces innovations which the countryside never would make such as in traffic and sanitation and for rationalistic calculation. Now, almost all underdeveloped countries have very large cities and by definition
their cities exercise this influence, but the theoretical problem initially set was how does a country achieve a high level of urbanization and how is this causally related to economic growth and development. The paper is not without empirical data and speculation on this question, however.

Specifically, Davis and Golden through their case studies note that the rate of urbanization varies considerably in the pre-industrial countries. India has urbanized less rapidly than expected, East Africa has increased at an extremely rapid rate and Egypt, Korea and Greece are over-urbanized agrarian countries. These empirical data pose a complex relationship between urbanization and economic development. They show that the factors presumed to be associated with cities may induce considerable variation in economic development and cultural change. To what factor may we attribute this variation? Davis and Golden attribute it to the urbanization level, itself, and to factors inducing both industrialization and urbanization such as the density of settlement in a country, the wealth of natural resources, or the pressures for capital investment, to mention only a few. Actually, the problem of assessing the role of cities in economic development and cultural change must first meet the problem by selecting a level of explanation. The paper by Davis and Golden seems to offer us helpful causal analysis for at least three separate levels of analysis: (1) They provide speculations on how cities, as a complex of factors, induce change, e.g., they are sources of major types of innovation. (2) They derive propositions on how the level of urbanization in a country may itself induce change, e.g., over-urbanization may accelerate economic growth by creating discontent of the urban masses. (3) They derive a major proposition that the ratio of people in cities to the total population achieves an equilibrium state with a particular level of economic development, i.e., there are equilibrium states in, at least, the pre- and post-industrial eras. The three levels of causal analysis are not linked. There is, further, the related mode of analysis dealing with how the level of urbanization is to be raised so that it is a factor in change as well as a resultant of other modes of change.

Focusing on the second level of analysis, how urbanization may be a factor in economic growth, the United States presents some interesting examples if post-diction is attempted. In the early days of the settlement of the country there was considerable variation in urbanization by geographical area. In fact as Adna Weber notes:

"Before 1820 the phenomenon of concentration of population was not to be found in the United States as a whole. In Maryland and Massachusetts, indeed, the urban population was gaining slightly upon the rural population, but in the commonwealths, including New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, where the largest proportions of residents were to be found, there was not such increase."

As late as 1890, in fact, 23.6 per cent of Louisiana's population was classed as living in places of 10,000 or more inhabitants which was about equal to that of Michigan and Wisconsin and above that of all other southern and most midwestern states. Given these levels of urbanization one could not readily predict the level of urbanization of given states, or that the urbanized ones would induce the most economic growth. It seems clear that New Orleans and its commerce accounted for much of the urbanization of the state of Louisiana in 1890. What urbanization existed in Michigan at that time also seems to have

been due to commerce, although some industry undoubtedly existed. The rapid urbanization of the one area as compared with the other seems rather obviously related to industrial expansion with the level of urbanization, itself, playing perhaps little, if any, role. The case of the United States is utilized to suggest that level of urbanization in an area may not be very prognostic of economic growth in shifting from one mode of historical economic organization to another unless, as in the case of Egypt, there is over-urbanization. Urbanization, however, may play an important role in inducing economic growth when the pattern of economic development is set by the environing system.

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THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF CITIES*

Urban sociology came into existence as a specialism in American sociology during the decade of the twenties. Its moving spirit was Robert Ezra Park of the University of Chicago. His fundamental theoretical formulations concerning the nature of city life constitute the foundations of urban sociology texts today. Park was influenced in his thinking by Comte and Durkheim; by Cooley, Dewey, and Mead; by Spencer and Sumner; and by Simmel. The central concepts of his urban sociology show these influences: he is aware of moral consensus and moral order, of the "person" as a participant in the moral order, of the struggle for existence among biological individuals, and of the influence of numbers on social life as that life is manifested in the forms of interaction.

Park elaborated these elements of social theory into a systematic sociology, but in every instance his main concern was city life. To him the city was the place where man was most sternly tested.1 Within his frame of reference the city is the social system where the struggle for existence is liberated to a large degree from the controls of the moral order so that competition and large numbers are the dynamic variables which determine the urban division of labor, the functional integration of the activities involved in the division of labor, the spatial distribution of people and activities, the fixing of natural areas, and the quality of social interaction. Culture enters into the analysis of the dynamics of city life primarily as technological, transportation, and communication artifacts together with the cognitive systems necessary to make use of them.

In the development of urban sociology that occurred at the University of Chicago and elsewhere, the relationship between the number and heterogeneity of population on the one hand and the quality of social relations and processes on the other constituted one main line of thought; while the determination of the division of labor, of functional integration, of spatial organization, and of the distribution and quality of population in relation to natural areas by the process of competition formed another.2

Turning to human ecology first, we can see that this approach grows directly out of Park's fundamental theoretical orientation. Before society is community, a population of biological individuals struggling for existence.

(*): The text of the paper remains as it was presented at the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Development and Cultural Change. I have attempted to comment on the remarks made by participants in the Conference in footnotes located in the paper at the points where the particular remarks seem most relevant.


The natural biological process occurring among these individuals is competition. Among human beings competition is for the most part economic and is one step removed from a sheerly biological struggle. Economic competition is likely to be a struggle for livelihood rather than sheer survival and is constrained to some degree by the existence of a shared moral order. Nevertheless, in Park's thought economic competition is always analogous to biotic competition and frequently homologous.

Competition, economic and/or biotic but always sub-social, produces a division of labor, a system of functional interdependence among the members of the population, and a spatial distribution of population and activity. All these are characteristic of the community. After an equilibrium is reached between the natural resources and the spatial characteristics of the environment on the one hand and the ecological community on the other, greater stability is achieved through the development of the moral order as a basis for social control. The development of the moral order marks the dominance of society over community and is to be measured by the degree to which competition is mitigated and eliminated.

If something happens to disturb the equilibrium of the biotic community — usually an increase in population — the moral order slackens its grip or may be completely shattered; competition takes over again and creates a new division of labor and ultimately a new adaptation to the equilibrium with the natural environment. To Park the modern city — especially Chicago — constituted such a state of disturbed equilibrium. Under these circumstances competition and population must be the prime determinants of city life, and the fundamental generalizations of ecological urban sociology are derived from these dynamic variables.

(3) Robert E. Park, "Symbiosis and Socialization: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Society," American Journal of Sociology, 45 (July, 1939), 1-25. This article was reprinted in Park, Human Communities, pp. 240-62, the posthumous collection of Park's articles cited in footnote 1. For convenience future references to this article and to others will cite this collection.

(4) Park, "Human Ecology," Human Communities, pp. 150-51. Professor Hughes in his discussion of my paper takes issue with my statement of the relations of these variables in terms of a time sequence, when Park was fundamentally talking about orders of phenomena. It is true that in Park's view any society and community as a going concern would be characterized both by a moral order and by competition. On the other hand in talking about the development of the division of labor during a period of disturbed equilibrium it is, as stated below, the moral order which is shattered and the process of competition which becomes dominant, followed by a restoration of equilibrium and the resumed dominance of the moral order. There is no way of avoiding the conclusion that this is a time sequence.

(5) Ibid., p. 150.

(6) Park, "Sociology, Community and Society," Human Communities, pp. 178-209. Professor Hughes indicates that I have underestimated Park's interest in the moral aspects of society, in that Park believed that man in the modern world cannot live without some religion and some faith. On the basis of the sources available to me and in relation to the problems with which I am concerned, division of labor, functional integra-
To any sociologist who believes that the system of value orientations of Western culture has had a major part in the historical creation of the urban industrial society and in its maintenance as a going concern, the theoretical orientation of Park and the ecologists must seem deficient. Hence, before applying the generalizations of urban ecology to cities in underdeveloped areas, the relationship of each such generalization to the basic theory of ecology must be stated and the generalization then modified to give full recognition to the place of the value orientations of the moral order in the determination of the phenomena with which they deal.

The first of these generalizations is that the functionally rational, highly specialized division of labor and its organization into highly rationalized corporate units oriented to a system of market relations in terms of profit making is the natural product of biotic and economic competition, population growth, and cultural artifacts. We have already seen that the typical growth cycle according to Park is as follows: a disturbance of equilibrium through population increase; a breakdown of the old moral order; the increase of biotic and economic competition; the development of a new division of labor; restoration of equilibrium; and stabilization through the new moral order. Hawley, going back to Spencer, states this thesis in its simplest form, namely, that complex functional organization is an "inevitable consequence of population growth and differentiation." He recognizes, however, that the failure of the Orient to carry organization in work to a high level despite great population growth poses a problem for this interpretation. Consequently he also uses Durkheim's theory of dynamic density of population which takes into account the frequency and nature of contacts among members of the increasing population. Thus the final formula includes population growth plus competition plus dynamic density based on the technology of communication and transportation.

Yet according to Max Weber, China possessed the demographic and technological factors favorable to the development of capitalist industrial enterprise and lacked some of the hindrances to be found in the West. It had a growing population, centuries of peace, artisans, and technological inventions. Weber found that China's failure to develop a highly specialized division of labor, etc., I have been unable to find any evidence that Park regarded moral values as dynamic elements in bringing about the development of the division of labor. The moral order in the economic realm seems to be a means of social control by which competition is mitigated, after competition has succeeded in bringing about a functionally integrated division of labor. It is my argument that these phenomena in the industrialized city cannot be understood without recourse to value systems as one of the variables necessary for the very existence of competition in society, and for the creation and maintenance of a functionally integrated division of labor, whether that integration is based on competition or on some other social process.

The best systematic account of this view is given by Hawley, Human Ecology, pp. 182-203.

Ibid., p. 195.

labor and the functionally rational bureaucratic economic enterprise to be due to a system of value orientations which discouraged rationalism and special-
isms, and which, although it was worldly and encouraged acquisition also en-
couraged traditionalism and the ideal of the well rounded human being living in harmony with the cosmos.\textsuperscript{10} In contrast the West inherited strong strains of rationalism which when united with the worldly asceticism of the Calvinist ethic produced the social type necessary to fuse the other variables into a new coherent social system.\textsuperscript{11}

If we accept the Weberian analysis it follows that modern industrial urban-
ism in the United States has its historical roots in a system of value orienta-
tions as well as in a set of demographic and technological factors. This sys-
tem of value orientations has had a long history and this paper is not the place to trace it. We can, however, indicate that these orientations have encouraged a willingness to sacrifice immediate gratifications for later ones, a tendency to interact with others in sharply limited roles, and an emphasis on performance in the distribution of values with such performance being judged on the basis of highly general and impersonal criteria. It is such orientations which Parsons sees as central to our social system and which he has described through the use of pattern variables.\textsuperscript{12} Thus it is important for the under-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Max Weber, The Religion of China, translated and edited by Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).
\item \textsuperscript{12} Parsons has argued that at the level of abstraction at which all social systems can be defined in common terms, value orientations can be ex-
haustively classified in terms of the polarities of affectivity-affective neutrality, specificity-diffuseness, universalism-particularism, achieve-
ment-ascription, and ego orientation-collectivity orientation. I have used only the first four of these since they seem sufficient for present purposes. Substituting the terms of these polarities for the description of the orientations above, urban industrialism can be said to demand value orientations which stress affective-neutrality, specificity, achieve-
\end{itemize}

Several comments on the discussion of the paper can be included here. First of all Professor Hauser remarked that the coining of neologisms did nothing to increase our knowledge of the phenomena with which we are concerned. It should be noted that in the passage above there was a description in simple English of certain value orientations in Western civilization, and then the neologisms were introduced in this footnote as shorthand terms for the longer descriptive sentence. It is my argument that the phenomena which these neologisms indicate do, when we understand them, increase our knowledge of the conditions under which urban industrialism arises and endures, and that these phenomena are not included in the theoretical explanation offered by the human ecologists.

Second, Professor Bogue has indicated that ecologists, such as Haw-
ley do take value orientations into consideration and that therefore peo-
ple like Walter Firey and myself are posing a false issue. I can find no place in Hawley's Human Ecology in which he uses a value concept in his explana-
standing of the American City to know that these value orientations of affective-neutrality, specificity, achievement, and universalism came to pervade the major normative and belief systems of American society: religion, morality, legal institutions, folkways, mors, proverbs, practical philosophies, ideologies, and norms governing social action in the political and occupational world. And to know, further, that these orientations functioning through these cultural elements of our society interacted with environmental, demographic, and technological aspects of our society to produce the modern division of labor, the market economy, and the bureaucratic enterprise.

Third, Professor Hughes remarks that the ecologists are using "as if" analytical models, admitting that they are abstracting from the total context. It is true that this is what they are doing, and it is also true that this is legitimate scientific procedure, provided the variables in the analytical model explain the phenomena which they are designed to explain. My argument, again, is that you cannot account for the development of the industrial division of labor and its functional integration on the basis of the variables included in the ecological frame of reference alone. The value variable must be included.

Fourth, in suggesting the study of the value variable, I am not suggesting that it be studied in isolation. It will be noted in the paragraphs which follow this footnote, reference is always made to the interaction of the value variables with demographic and technological variables. I am in favor of detailed studies of cities as going concerns, including descriptions of their spatial patterning and ways of living, provided that the conceptual scheme within which they are described and analyzed includes a category of value.

Fifth, Professors Davis and Hoselitz raise the question as to how values are to be studied. Professor Hoselitz suggests that one might derive the value system of the modern city by studying its economic and ecological patterns without concerning one's self with the religious culture. Once one accepts the necessity for using the value category in attempting a description of any social system, what Professor Hoselitz says is true; but if one is attempting to demonstrate the validity of attributing functional or causal efficacy to a set of values, then the values cannot be derived from the phenomena which they are designed to explain. If you are trying to establish that the modern industrial system has its roots partly in the Puritan tradition, you cannot demonstrate this by deriving the tradition from the facts that men worked hard and were frugal. This is why it was necessary for Weber to use other sources for showing the existence of these values. The use of these sources raises the question posed by Professor Davis, namely that the use of written documents for deriving the content of an ideological system is problematic, and that ecological studies are a good way of getting at conclusions. Again, I agree, that the study of values must be based on the analysis of social structures as going concerns including the ways of living and the activities of the people, provided that the value variable is included in the analysis. In this analysis, however, written documents are not to be completely shrugged off. If it is true as Professor Davis says that you can study the Bible a long time and still not know much...
It is also important to know that value orientations constituted by these same pattern variables functioned yesterday and function today to maintain our industrial society as a going concern. But this knowledge involves not the origin and growth of the urban industrial system, but its functional integration and social cohesion. Returning to Park's basic theory it is necessary to examine the second major generalization of ecological urban analysis, the belief that the cohesion of the city is to be found in the interlocking of functions brought about through the division of labor. It must be remembered that the dominance of the process of competition in the Chicago of the 1920's indicated to Park the relative freedom from the moral order which the inhabitants of Chicago enjoyed; hence integration and articulation of occupational statuses in the economic sphere must be due to the interdependence produced by interlocked and specialized functions which are in turn dependent on the process of competition.  

A fundamental deficiency is discernible in this theoretical orientation when one recognizes that economic competition among men is not really analogous or homologous to biotic competition among animals. Animals have limited sets of biological needs and given an absence of direct contacts which result in conflict an impersonal biotic competition may well be the dominant process of interaction. But man participates in economic affairs as a seeker of culturally defined ends, and such ends if not normatively limited are infinite. Further, men are conscious of their economic activities so that if their ends are not normatively limited they know that each is in competition with everyone else; and conscious competition unless normatively achieved inevitably results in the war of all against all. Thus moral order is necessary in human society not to mitigate competition but to prevent or lessen open conflict. Competition on the economic level or any other level of human activity is an achievement made possible only through the existence in the social system of a set of value orientations, supportive ideological and religious beliefs, and a body of institutionalized norms internalized within many if not most actors in the system and supported by external sanctions.  

about the value system of the United States, I would claim that it is also true that it is doubtful that you can know much about the value system of the United States without knowing the content of the Bible and the use to which that content has been put in the history of this nation.

Finally, Professor Singer raises the point concerning the preciseness of definition of the pattern variables. How, for example, can we differentiate between affective neutrality in our culture and in Indian culture? This point is well taken, and indicates need for further refinement of definition. At present the difficulty can be handled partly by indicating the area of objects with which a value pattern is primarily concerned; and also by considering the value patterns in combinations, as we have done in describing the four major patterns governing modern urban industrial structure.

(13) Hawley employs this principle to explain the basis of what he calls "corporate groups." He also indicates another source of community cohesion in the relations which exist among units performing similar functions; such units form categoric groups. In both cases, however, competition, differentiation, and organization are the processes which account for integration. See Hawley, op. cit., pp. 207-22.

(14) Cf. Parson's account of Durkheim's effort to deal with the non-contrac-
The securing of a functional competitive integration through a system of shared value orientations is, however, more than a matter of preventing conflict. As Park well knew, historical societies, as well as contemporary pre-literate societies, have solved the problem of order through ascriptive-particularistic systems of value orientation or through achievement-particularistic orientations. In the case of the first type of orientations co-operation, usually on a kinship basis, is encouraged instead of competition. In the second type competition may be present but kinship ties are still strong and the highly specialized division of labor fails to develop as happened in the case of China. Thus a society in which competition and an extended division of labor have flourished have been those in which universalistic and achievement value orientations have been dominant in the economic sphere. The market society has been created and maintained by these two crucial value variables. Thus the competitive order of early twentieth century Chicago was also a moral order, and where moral order was lacking the result was not competition but conflict.

We can now reformulate the two central ecological generalizations concerning urban industrial social structure in the following manner: Given a growing population, expanding areas of interaction, technical development, and universalistic-achievement value orientations the growth of an urban industrial order is rendered probable through the type and level of social competition which is generated, the increasing rationality of economic action, and the differentiation and organization of a complex division of labor into a system of market relations and bureaucratic economic enterprises. Of great assistance in such development is a political system which stresses the same orientations in opposition to traditional, religious, or authoritarian control of society. The quarrel over the extent and nature of state intervention in the economic process can be fought out within the basic political structure.

Before moving down the ladder of abstraction by differentiating sub-orders of the type described above, it is necessary to indicate one possibility of social and economic development in city life which becomes apparent only when value orientations are added to the variables of the ecologist. Although the industrial city probably requires universalistic-achievement orientations for its origination and can be maintained with the same orientations, once such a pattern has come into existence it can apparently be taken over by a society with universalistic-ascriptive orientations. This is implicitly suggested by Parsons in his discussion of basic societal types.\(^1\)\(^5\) Competition is subjected to rigorous repression or control. There is emphasis on the areas of occupation and economic organization, but stress is placed on what the person is rather than what he has done. Further there is a strong tendency toward collectivism and authoritarianism, with stress placed on politics rather than economics.\(^1\)\(^6\) It follows from our argument that the interaction of demographic and technological variables in a complex industrial city with such value patterns will produce different urban characteristics from those which result from the interaction of ecological and demographic variables with universalistic-achievement value orientations. It is not my intention in this paper, however, to carry this analysis further, since our efforts in the underdeveloped areas are con-

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Footnotes:

1. Parsons, Structure of Social Action, pp. 308-16; 335-38.


3. Ibid.
concerned with industrialization under the guidance of universalistic-achievement values only.

Even with this more limited task we are still not ready to move from the American city to the city in underdeveloped areas. The historic, time-bound qualities of ecological generalizations are still too great even though we have now elaborated and connected the concepts of value orientation with those of population growth, technology, differentiation, organization, and functional integration. Chicago, 1900-1930 model, is still only a sub-type of the universalistic-achievement oriented industrial social order. In some respects it bears great and direct relevance to the cities in underdeveloped areas; in other respects its relevance is much less.

In the period from 1870 to 1930 in America, and certainly in Chicago, the universalistic-achievement pattern had been pushed to an extreme where it was barely capable of creating and sustaining a social order. Protestant individualism had always been extreme in some respects; now, having created its most pure product in Chicago, it had placed itself under the stress of forces pushing it either in more extreme directions or in the direction of breakdown and anomie. There were countless opportunities in the fluid, changing social structure for a man to forge ahead if he operated smartly or to become wealthy by engaging in open economic war. Thus to many people the legal institutions and the norms against force and fraud must have appeared to be conditions to be circumvented rather than rules to be obeyed. If such opportunities appealed to the respectable who had internalized the values of the city, how much more they must have lured the country boy or immigrant whose values were much less definite and whose legitimate chances were much smaller. Moreover, the political order was such that sanctions were not always forthcoming unless the basic rights of property were challenged. Thus the moral order spawned both its own extreme in the form of the law of the economic jungle and its closely related negation in frequent instances of complete anomie.

Men had families and presumably they had friends, and in these areas of life ascriptive and particularistic standards of action to some extent prevailed; but even among the most righteous citizens — or rather, most among the righteous citizens — standards of achievement judged by universalistic criteria were applied without let to the customer, the employee, and the stranger. Further, the focus of interest in people was highly specific and did not extend into their non-market activities or rooming-house isolation so long as these were not too visible and did not interfere with growing enterprises. The value orientations themselves, frequently formulated in Darwinian terms, were stretched to the point where they frequently became justifications for the use of force and fraud. In many areas of life competition had been replaced by open conflict along class lines, business lines, or respectable world-underworld lines. Thus Chicago was a peculiar combination of morally created and ordered competition constantly verging on and frequently breaking over the borderline into anomic conflict.

Yet the order held. Deviation and near-normless behavior may have in some instances aided in the elaboration of the industrial system; but it could not have brought that system into existence and maintained it. The moral order was strong enough to prevent adventurers' enterprise in the realm of force and fraud from completely supplanting and destroying the giant industrial system that developed; and when the economic order collapsed, the moral order and its values shifted enough to permit and encourage political action to salvage the situation. Thus today the system still functions with both its values and its institutions modified but not destroyed. All its problems are not solved,
yet Chicago endures as a competitive social system; and were it not for the fears generated by the struggle with Russia, one could say that the stability of its order seems greater today than yesterday.

The social theory of the city has not caught up with the changes which have occurred, nor has it assessed the significance of the dynamic moral order that has persisted in shaping the structure and the functions of the city.17

Having modified the ecological theory of urban industrial development and maintenance by attempting to assess both the importance of the value orientations in the moral order and the degree and significance of anomic conflict in American urban life, what can we say of the city in the underdeveloped area? First, of course, it seems likely that either old cities or newly developing ones which adopt the life of industrialism under our auspices or with our help must do so by accepting universalistic-achievement values. It does not seem likely that a society can remain attached to either a system of particularisticascriptive values orientations or one of particularistic-achievement values and hope to become industrialized. Nor does it seem likely that we will encourage or accept industrialization under the shaping force of universalistic-ascriptive values.

Second, it is doubtful that the cities of the underdeveloped areas will adopt the extreme version of universalistic-achievement values present in Chicago in the period from 1900 to 1930. Americans who hold that version of our values are not likely to work in Point Four if it continues, and if they secure political power they are not likely to continue the program. More probable is an effort to encourage local leaders in government and business to moderate these values by stressing the welfare of the masses of the people and the interventionist role of government. Yet many of the other conditions which were present in industrializing Chicago are likely to be present in the industrializing city today: the breakdown of older value-orientation systems, the influx of unassimilated immigrants, the anomic producing conditions of rapid change, the opportunities for quick advancement or wealth through deviation, and the anomic response of those with threatened vested interests. In some cases these factors will be present in an intensity absent from the American city; in others they may be less intense. Thus in order to become more specific in our application of ecological urban sociology to the cities of underdeveloped areas, we must turn our attention to two of the derivative ecological generalizations, modify them in light of our analysis of the central generalizations, and apply them in the contests just discussed.

To the human ecologist the division and specialization of work and the integration of functions always has a spatial dimension because his view of the community conceives its members as earth-bound physical organisms occupying and moving over land or up from land in physical structures. Land thus has frictional qualities such as extension and topography and use qualities which may include extension and topography but also includes soil quality, natural resources, and other physical elements. In the city, however, stress is placed more purely on extension and topography as conditions or means of functional activities, since the activities of the city essentially involve problems of space occupancy and spatial movement.

Now it is true that all human action, at the very minimum, involves the

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(17) The first real attempt to formulate in theoretical terms the changes in American urban life is to be found in David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).
occupancy of space since the actor is always implicated in his physical organ-
ism and it usually involves movement and communication over land when so-
cial interaction is present. Occupancy of space always involves a distribution
problem for a social system, and where movement is involved there is always
an element of time and energy cost. From these universal conditions and
potential means of human action, however, the ecologists, because of their the-
oretical frame of reference, draw mistaken conclusions. Thus, as we would
expect, units of functional activity compete with one another for spatial posi-
tion. Units which need maximum accessibility because of their specialization
and which are able to use land intensively compete for central location. Other
units arrange themselves in positions away from the center on the basis of
their functional need and ability to move to the center, to receive from the cen-
ter, and to bear the time-energy costs of movement. This action according
to the ecologists does not necessarily involve rationality but simply the adap-
tations of organisms involved in a struggle for existence within a natural en-
vironment. The effects of such competition reveal themselves in land-val-
ues, and it is the ability of a unit of activity to pay rent or buy which deter-
dines whether it can secure the spatial position it needs.

On the basis of this aspect of the biotic and economic struggle human ac-
tivities come to be distributed in zonal patterns, and the nature and relations
of the zones are dependent upon the level of economy, technology, transporta-
tion, and communication which a particular community has reached. An urban
industrial community will have zones of business, zones of workingmen's homes,
zones of middle-class residences, zones of commuters' residences, and zones
of transition and deterioration. Firey has successfully shown that land-space
can be involved in the moral order to the extent that actors will resist the
pressures of competition and land values to live in a particular area because
of sentiment and tradition. The ecologists' response has been that the influ-

(18) If I understand the following quotation from Walter Firey correctly the
passage above is in disagreement with his position concerning the rela-
tion of systems of value orientation to problems of time and energy cost
arising from space: "... the very impeditiveness of space is of cultural
definition, since it is only through its status as a productive agent that
space has to be 'dealt with' so that it imposes end-deprivation, or 'cost,'
upon social systems." Walter Firey, Land Use in Central Boston (Cam-

(19) Hawley, op. cit., p. 264.

(20) Ibid., p. 179.

(21) Ernest W. Burgess, "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Re-
search Project," in Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick
D. McKenzie, The City (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925),
pp. 47-62.

I have used Burgess' terms without stating that he placed them in a
series of concentric circles, because I am not interested in the validity
of the hypothesis as contrasted with sector and multiple-nuclei hypothe-
ses. The theoretical frame of reference from which all of these hypo-
theses can be logically derived is the focus of interest, and the problems
raised by the differences in the hypotheses do not affect that frame of
reference of the general categories of distributed activities.

(22) Firey, op. cit., pp. 87-135. He has also shown the importance of space
as symbol and the influence of social solidarity on land-use, pp. 136-225.
ence of the moral order on the use of space has never been denied, and that all sorts of hindrances on the establishment of purely ecological zonal patterns have been recognized. What they have never admitted, however, is that the spatial distribution of activities and people based on economic competition is largely the result of a particular kind of moral order, namely, that moral order in which universalistic-achievement value orientations predominate. 23

It will not do to attack this position on the ground that there is no universal friction of space and no expenditure of time and energy in moving through space, for these are universal features of human existence. Nevertheless biological cost in this sense does not necessarily result in an economic cost which determines the location of human activities and units of activity. In societies where the moral order imposes highly limited traditional ends, the friction of space may be completely undeterminative because the limits it imposes may be broader than the limits imposed by the moral order. If these limits set by the friction of space are pressed, there may be purely latent mechanisms by which the costs imposed are paid for by the sacrifice of values dependent upon efficient adaptation of means to ends. Finally, even if members of the society become aware of the economic cost of the friction of space where the limited ends press upon the availability of means, the sacrifice of some ends may be consciously and deliberately made.

Even in a social order like our own, where because of the predominance of value orientations forcing the rational adaptation of means to ends to become a central conscious factor the friction of space is measured in land-value terms, some actors refuse to orient themselves to space in a fashion determined by the norm of economic efficiency. In such a society, however, the alternative orientations to space are subordinate to the economic orientation; therefore the distribution of population and activity throughout the city occurs largely in a competitively determined zonal pattern. Thus as cities in underdeveloped areas implement a set of universalistic-achievement value orientations there will be a tendency for such a pattern to develop whether it be in the form of concentric circles, sectors, or multiple nuclei. Furthermore, even where this unintended consequence of a market economy is interfered with on the basis of values other than those of pure universalism, achievement, and competition, the distribution and movement of people over the land will always have to be measured, at least in part, in terms of land values and of time-energy cost involving the sacrifice of ends.

At this point, however, we must return to the point that universalistic-achievement values almost invariably will take a more moderate form in the cities of underdeveloped areas than they did in Chicago in the 1920's. Hence we must expect to find many other central determinants of spatial distribution and movement than those involved in ecological theory. Further, even at the level of pure cost there will usually be an awareness that cost to individuals and units of activity may not be the same as cost to the total social system. It is very likely that workers will be expected to live close to their work in terms of time-cost distance. There will be a zone of transition as highly active industrial and commercial zones expand, and promise to move into new areas. But some modification of the historic pattern will be made because cer-

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(23) Louis Wirth has indicated that ecology has the function of describing the unintended social consequences of market situations. See Louis Wirth, "Human Ecology," American Journal of Sociology, 51 (May, 1945), 483-88. This statement of Wirth is noted by Edward Shils, The Present State of American Sociology (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press), p. 9, note 6.
tain limits will be placed on the conditioning effect of economic cost by ends which transcend the market and because even economic costs will be figured at least partially in terms of the entire social system. Of one thing we can be almost certain, namely that if these modifications do not occur and neo-social Darwinism is allowed to predominate, the conditions of the zone of transition and the costs of those conditions will exceed any conditions and costs in the development of our own industrial urbanism.

Given the existence of a market, the values of universalism and achievement, and the development of industry, the generalizations of the ecologists concerning the distribution of industry and units of activity tend to be realized. Thus the modification of this distributive tendency on the basis of other values must be conscious and achieved, frequently, on a political basis. Some aspects of ecological patterning are more easily controlled through democratic planning than others. The prevention of deterioration in the zone of transition can probably be more easily achieved politically than can the control of the patterning of residential location and residential movements. Therefore the processes of invasion and succession, particularly as these concepts apply to the residential movements of ethnic populations into and out of certain areas of the city, may come closest to approximating the American pattern. It is likely also that the processes of dominance and centralization as they relate to the establishment and growth of the economic center of the city and other subordinate nuclei of commercial and industrial activity, will be consciously furthered by political planners. These are, after all, to be industrial civilizations.24

The final ecological generalization with which we shall deal — one closely related to the spatial distribution of activities — is the proposition concerning natural areas. As people compete for geographic position in the city its natural areas — based on land values, time-cost distance from the center, and other competitive variables — tend to draw people into them who have attitudes, and functions similar to the people already living there.25

Moreover, the natural area tends to impose its influence on the person

(24) Invasion and succession are processes constituted by the change through time of activities and units of activity occupying a particular spatial location. To the extent that a market economy is dominant in a social system, these changes are a manifestation of the process of economic competition. It is suggested here that these processes in the sphere of residence may be left relatively uncontrolled by the political associations of the society.

Dominance is a form of integration of the actions of a system through the existence of a center of control. The market system of a free industrial society has as such a center the complex of highly specialized activities at the center of the networks of communication and transportation. In a city this is usually the physical center. Here too it is to be expected that the cities of underdeveloped areas are likely to follow closely the American pattern. However, in at least one city of the society it is likely that a national center of political dominance will occupy the central spatial area. See Park, "Dominance," Human Communities, pp. 159-64.

living in it since he must acquire certain attitudes and behavior patterns in order to maintain himself in the situation which the area presents. Thus it is possible in ecological studies to map not only general residential and business areas, but areas where other particular kinds of people and activity tend to cluster together. Zorbaugh's study of the furnished-room dweller is based on the use of the natural area. On the basis of an analysis of the register of Illinois lodging houses he selected a rooming house area on the lower north side of Chicago. Ninety blocks were studied by means of a house to house census. In this area 71% of the houses took in roomers. Most of the roomers were in the 20-35 age range, unmarried, with no children. Placed in the situation of the area — one of isolation, anonymity, loneliness, and normlessness — they were forced into various forms of withdrawal, fantasy and substitution in order to achieve satisfactions.

It is important to note that in the case of natural areas ecological theory, even when modified by recognizing that the kind of competition it envisages is dependent upon value orientations, can tell us no more than that people with certain objective characteristics competing for living space become located in a particular area characterized by certain indices. Thus in the present case unmarried migrants between the ages of 20 and 35, earning small incomes, are able to pay a rent which locates them in an area where 71% of the houses take in roomers. Explanation of the other characteristics of the area — isolation, anonymity, loneliness, and normlessness — and of the responses of the inhabitants to such characteristics leads to an analysis of the second strand of theoretical thought in urban sociology: the conditioning of the quality of social relations through the size and heterogeneity of the city population.

The numbers-heterogeneity interpretation of the quality of urban social relations is not necessarily in conflict with the orthodox ecological approach to urban phenomena. Heterogeneity, for example, is derived from the division of labor — since the latter both creates separate social worlds for those in different functional positions and attracts diverse peoples from outside the city. This interpretation goes beyond ecology, however, in deriving several social phenomena from the resultant heterogeneity when it is combined with large numbers.

(26) Ibid.
(27) Ibid., pp. 99-105.
(28) Park himself suggested this line of development more than he actually worked it out. Prior to Park this orientation is to be found in the sociology of Georg Simmel under whom Park studied. See his "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in Kurt H. Wolff (ed. and tr.), The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 409-24. The earliest full length statement of this position was made by Nicholas J. Spykman in his "A Social Philosophy of the City," in Ernest W. Burgess (ed.), The Urban Community, Chicago, pp. 55-64. A more extended statement was made by Louis Wirth in "Urbanism as a Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology, 44 (July 1938), 1-24. This article was reprinted in Paul K. Hatt and Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (eds.), Reader in Urban Sociology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 32-49. Citations will be made to this reprinting. The most recent restatement was made by Kingsley Davis in Human Society (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 328-41.
On the basis of these criteria the city is defined as a "relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals." Urbanism as a way of life is to be found in such settlements in increasing degree as the criteria of definition are more closely approximated. The problem of the urban sociologist is to discover the social relations and forms of social organization which flow from the presence of such demographic criteria.

Before proceeding to analyze the derivation of social relations from the numbers-density-division of labor-heterogeneity sequence, however, it is necessary to indicate that just as an extremely complex and rationalized division of labor does not follow from numbers and density without an organizing value system, the same must be said of social heterogeneity. Not all cities are a "melting-pot of races, peoples, and cultures." A system of value-orientations encouraging trade and commerce is the normative cultural condition necessary for the development of social heterogeneity. It is possible for a city to have a population which shares common values and which can co-operate for a common purpose. Even in the Chicago of the first three decades of the twentieth century where the extreme stress on universalistic-achievement orientations did produce trade, commerce, industry, a rationalized division of labor and social heterogeneity, the dominant group of that city shared those value orientations and developed and supported an institutional system which shaped a dense population to produce such economic phenomena. Thus it took a shared value system to produce the heterogeneity which in turn did frequently threaten its supporting institutional structure.

Applying this to the problem of heterogeneity in the cities of underdeveloped areas, it seems very doubtful that such cities can afford the degree of conflict-producing diversity which characterized Chicago. This again means less stress on the purely laissez-faire, individualistic aspects of universalistic-achievement orientations and the acceptance of the welfare, rising level of living for all politics of modern industrial societies. Further these cities will industrialize largely through the efforts of a directing government or not at all. The question is whether the politicians, planners, and business men will attempt to industrialize the backward societies in such a way as to encourage the modern version of universalistic-achievement values or will throw these social systems into universalistic-ascriptive orientations either by trying to implement an extreme individualism or by surrendering to authoritarian collectivistic groups in such societies. One way of loading the dice in the latter direction would be to accept the idea that the social heterogeneity which placed such a strain on the institutions of Chicago was an instance of the universal social results of the demographic features of cities.

Turning now to the social characteristics of cities stated to be due to numbers, density, and heterogeneity of the population we find the greatest stress placed on the secondary quality of social relations. The city itself, by virtue of its size, is a secondary group. The person has frequent contact with strangers, and in order to protect himself must keep such contact at a super-

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(30) Wirth, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

(31) Ibid.

(32) Ibid., p. 38.

(33) Spykman does not believe this to be possible. Cf. Spykman, op. cit., p. 58.

ficial level. There is a rating of acquaintances by the same external standards that are applied to strangers, and a probability that even friends will be known only in a limited segment of their lives.\(^3\) Further, the city man substitutes a life in associations for life in the primary community, or else becomes completely isolated and lonely.\(^6\) "The bonds of kinship, of neighborliness, and the sentiments arising out of living together for generations under a common folk tradition are likely to be absent....\(^7\)

It is true that certain of these characteristics will be found in any city; but others will be found only where universalistic-achievement values have been emphasized to an extreme degree. It is obviously impossible for the city to be a primary community if such a community requires that each person interact with all other persons on an intimate face-to-face basis. Further it is true that the urban person will live his life in associations rather than with all the members of the community. But if the emphasis on universalism and achievement is not extreme, the community can possess strong common purposes and shared values; the person can use particularistic criteria in orienting much of his action toward other people; and diffuse bonds of neighborliness and perhaps even kinship can develop and endure. There are those who believe that these traits are coming to characterize at least some areas of city life in America. They are certainly possible in the cities of the underdeveloped areas if the stress upon Western values remains moderate.

Even the migrant to the city of the underdeveloped area need not become the isolated counterpart to the dweller in Chicago's furnished rooms. Governments can make the effort to see that families and even whole villages migrate, provided they accept the value orientation that their interest in the migrant must extend beyond his work and contribution to industrialization. The people who were in power in early twentieth century Chicago were not concerned about the loneliness of some of the migrants to the great city; and by the value standards of the time they were not expected to be. Like Chicago, the cities of the backward regions will be filled with migrants, but the agencies which deal with them and the migrants themselves need not be characterized by an extreme emphasis on universalistic-achievement orientations.

Size and density of cities will not by themselves or assisted by heterogeneity create the primacy of secondary relations, isolation, and loneliness. Only when there is extreme stress on universalism and achievement accompanied by other features of industrialization, can these demographic factors produce such social characteristics. There is always the possibility, however, that the moderate emphasis on universalism and achievement required for industrialism — unless it is to be accomplished through an authoritarian ascriptive system — may by the social change it creates destroy its own moderateness. In any rapidly changing social system — unless the change is rigidly controlled through authoritarian techniques — there will be social mobility, the protests and actions of people with vested interests, a breakdown of older normative systems, and the uprooting of individuals and social groups. In other words the backward cities will have all the same conditions which pushed Chicago's social system in the direction of a survival of the fittest emphasis on universalism and achievement and of a closely related but not identical anomie except two: an extreme emphasis on universalism and achievement to begin with an extreme social

\(^{35}\) Ibid., pp. 330-31.

\(^{36}\) Spykman, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

\(^{37}\) Wirth, op. cit., p. 39.
heterogeneity. Yet these two distinctive features may be determining, for they should permit the political association of the society to slow down the rate of change where necessary, to modify the consequences of change, and to lay continual stress on raising the level of living of all the people. There is at least the possibility of the orderly development of urban industrialism under the aegis of a state guided by a moderate emphasis on achievement and universalism which recognizes the necessity for sizeable areas of life which must be left to the older values of ascription and particularism.

Closely related to the stress on secondary relations in urban society is the corresponding stress on secondary means of social control. The person can be freed of primary controls, according to the urban sociologist, by disappearing into the mass of strangers. In this anonymous state he can do as he pleases so long as his public observable behavior is not too bizarre or dangerous. The urban community in order to control even this behavior is forced to use political and legal measures, and the church, if it does control, does so through secondary associations. All this is true, at least to some degree of the modern American city. But that which makes it true is once again the stress upon universalistic-achievement orientations. The person is subject to the powerful secondary disciplines of industrial bureaucracy and to the stringent primary controls of his family, social class (or his acquaintances in it), and friends. To the extent that he has time to escape these groups he can become somewhat anonymous, although the degree and safety of anonymity have been greatly exaggerated even in the American city. Most of his behavior, however, is subject to the controls of his family and his class, if he accepts the culturally engendered goals of the society. The power of the secondary state is used not so much to control the actions of the individual — although it is true that a substantial segment of the population must be so controlled — but rather to control the activities of the large secondary associations: and these are the fruit not of urbanism but of the market system engendered by industrial values.

In the city of the underdeveloped areas change and uprooting will require secondary control of the person, but moderateness in attempting to develop a universalistic-achievement system of institutions will, as has been indicated, prevent large numbers of people from becoming isolated and will prevent the growth of deviant natural areas in the spatial organization of the city. Secondary control will be necessary to guide economic associations in their industrializing activities, but consensus on a welfare version of the industrial community from the beginning will prevent the degree of anomie and conflict prevalent in American cities of an earlier period and still to a high degree present today. Primary controls of a community oriented variety can be much more prominent both in the control of individual action and of corporate action.

To make an analysis of social control in the cities of the underdeveloped areas along the lines suggested above, does not commit one to the belief that urbanization and industrialization will be easy processes for the people and social systems involved. It does mean that the growth and existence of cities, as such, will not produce tremendous heterogeneity, secondary social relations,

(38) I do not hold that none of the cities of backward areas are extremely heterogeneous, but certainly many of them drawing from a single hinterland for their migrants will be more homogeneous than is Chicago even today.


(40) Ibid.
and secondary methods of social control. Rather these are the product of a
development of a rational division of labor, the processes of uprooting and
change, and an extreme emphasis upon universalism and achievement. We do
not know whether the first two accompanied by a moderate emphasis on uni-

eralism and achievement together with a corresponding emphasis on ascription
and particularism in certain aspects of social relations will produce an orderly
satisfying change to an industrial society or not. We are not even certain of this
with regard to our own society as yet. We do know that there have been
cities of the past where particularistic-ascriptive values have predominated,
where change was slow, and industrialism in the modern sense absent. Thus
population size and density cannot be used as the solely determining variables
of the secondary relations and controls of our own cities. We also know that
an extreme emphasis on universalism and achievement has pervaded our cul-
ture from the time of Calvin, and that this emphasis produced an accelerating
and uncontrolled wave of change reaching its peak in the rawness of the twen-

tieth century Chicago of the urban sociologists. We know that this emphasis
has abated or changed in recent years and that new patterns of life are appear-
ing in our own cities. Finally we know that the underdeveloped areas in order
to industrialize must change and must at least moderately emphasize univer-
salism and achievement. From our own experience we ought not expect the
cities of such areas to take on the characteristics of our early twentieth cen-
tury cities. If the resistance to change and to the necessary accumulation of
capital is not too great orderly development in the direction of democratic in-
dustrial societies is possible; if it is too great the consequence will be the Uni-

iversalistic-ascriptive city system, even more unlike the cities described by
our urban sociologists.

A final word should be said about what was not attempted in this paper.
American urban sociologists have recognized the existence of different types
of cities with different structures and different functions, usually based upon
a different role in the economic pattern. These differences in structure and
function have not been explored in this paper, although I do not deny their ex-

istence or their relevance. Rather it has seemed to me to be important to
point out that the universal distinctive characteristics of cities as they have
been indicated by American urban sociologists are not universal but histori-
cally relative; are not based on demography and ecology alone but also on the
conditioning effect of a system of value-orientations; are not even contempo-

rary American but 1920 American; and cannot apply without serious modifica-
tion to the formulation of hypotheses about the role of cities in the economic
development of the backward areas. I have also attempted to show what some
of the modifications of urban social theory must be, if we are to use the tools
of social science in understanding the social problems of the underdeveloped
areas and to participate in the shaping of a more democratic industrial world
both in those areas and in our own society. These remarks can only be a be-

ginning in this direction, but it is a time for new beginnings.

William L. Kolb

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Mr. Kolb's reading of Park differs from mine at some points. He sees a time sequence in Park's scheme, starting from biotic competition, going on to social rules and social order. I do not read a time sequence as one of the essential points of Park's system. The notion of time sequence may appear here and there, but the emphasis is on interaction of orders of things, not on time sequences.

Mr. Kolb also underestimates Park's interest in the moral aspects of society. He did not happen to use the phrase value-orientation; following Cooley he talked rather of moral order and of social order. What are value-orientations if not the things that Adam Smith called moral sentiments in a book by that very title? And what are affectivity and affective-neutrality supposed to indicate if not the familiar distinction between feeling or emotion and rational thought? What is the achievement-ascription polarity if not the distinction between status and earned place so familiar to anyone who has read Cooley, Toennies, and a dozen others? What is the playing of roles if not the well-known phenomenon, called in this case by the same name, which is so clearly the heart of the theories of Mark Baldwin, W. I. Thomas, George H. Mead, even of Robert E. Park and many others? The distinction between the ego-oriented and the collectivity-oriented seems to have some relation to a long-familiar distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (in reverse order, of course).

Incidentally, it is a bit odd to read that Park was a creature of provincial knowledge of one city, Chicago, at a particular moment in its history; he was, in fact, one of the most widely read and widely traveled men of his time; he liked to trace the sources of his thought. Quite incidentally, and almost accidentally, he focused his efforts on Chicago relatively late in his career for a short time. It is possible, and that is perhaps the main justification for the aside of the last few sentences, that the misreading on the point of Park's interest in the goals which guide men in their efforts and struggles comes in part from a difference of vocabulary, Park's being older and simpler. The notion that Park based his ideas on the Chicago of the 1920's alone may come from the fact that it was in the Chicago of the 1920's that Park, and his associates, did some pioneering empirical work (for which his students were duly prepared by being required to read Charles Booth's Life and Labour of the People of London and many other surveys of cities in other places and epochs).

Park makes a great deal of one distinction which Kolb seems relatively unaware of; that between biotic competition and the conscious competition of a highly organized market with rules and sanctions. The stock exchange was one of the institutions which fascinated him, precisely because it is a highly organized institution, with rigid rules of membership, fixed gestures and symbols to designate sale, agreed upon standards and units; in short, competition of a kind and degree possible only in society, where men consciously pursue goals (values). This is not the same thing as, say, the pattern of redistribution of land that came about on the Quebec-Vermont border because French-Canadians had more children than English-Protestant Vermonters or Canadians;

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(1) See Park's paper "Physics and Society" in Hart, C. W. M. (Editor) Essays in Sociology, Toronto, 1940.
and because the latter were more market-oriented in their agriculture and in their lives generally. There were no rules in the competition of these two ethnic groups for the land, but competition it was nevertheless.

Park was well aware of the fact that one sets up models, looks at the facts and judges the models by the facts. He knew well enough, and made it perfectly clear, that one studies facts of certain orders and in certain circumstances as if there were perfect competition. I find no implication in his work that the competition and the geography would get the same result everywhere as in Chicago at a certain epoch. He was also quite well aware, and there is plenty of evidence of it in his work, of the value of ideal-types (which are the same thing as those theoretical constructs which are now called "models"). The definition of cities is certainly susceptible to analysis by use of ideal-types, but there is danger that the ideal-types will be set up at too great distance from the empirical realities to be of much use.

The real question before us, however, is not what Park or someone else did or did not do. It is rather: how are we going to get on with the comparative study of cities? How will cities grow in parts of the world where customs, institutions and technology are not the same as in European societies? The first thing is obviously to study these cities as they are; many of them. Le-Tourneau has recently described the physical pattern of several of the major cities of North Africa. They have grown up about earlier Muslim cities, which had their characteristic pattern of bazaar and mosque. On this has been imposed, in various ways, the European pattern as Europeans have taken over sovereignty and, in some case, have introduced industries of European kind. In nearly all of them, the latest comers are uprooted Berbers — peasants or shepherds — who live on the outskirts in oil-can huts, caves and tents; this in contrast to the European and American industrial cities where (even as in Chicago), the newest comers (except for the transients of middle-management so well described by William Hollingsworth Whyte in Fortune) tend to live in decaying slums near the center of the city. There are and will be many patterns of city growth and distribution. As a matter of method, we will probably be as likely to discover the value systems of the people who live in them by starting with the ecology as we would be to discover the ecology by projection from the value systems. I agree that value systems must be understood, but I rather suspect that a value system is more difficult to discover than an ecological system. It is better scientific practice to move from the more to the less apparent than in the other direction; but it is best of all to keep as many orders of things before one as is possible. In either case, the best study of cities is cities.

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The foregoing lines are a composite from the typed notes which I used in discussing Mr. Kolb's paper at the meeting and my remarks as recorded and dittooed by the reporter. I have added no new points.

In a series of footnotes Mr. Kolb reaffirms his reading of Park. In answer, let me quote just one passage from Park:

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(2) See, for example, for the earlier history of one such city, Roger LeTourneau, Fès avant le Protectorat, Casablanca, 1949.

"The city is rooted in the habits and customs of the people who inhabit it. The consequence is that the city possesses a moral as well as a physical organization, and these two mutually interact in characteristic ways to mold and modify one another. It is the structure of the city which first impresses us by its visible vastness and complexity. But this structure has its basis, nevertheless, in human nature, of which it is an expression. . . . Structure and tradition are but different aspects of a single cultural complex which determines what is characteristic and peculiar to city, as distinguished from village life and the life of the open fields."  

Everett C. Hughes

University of Chicago

(4) Robert E. Park, Human Communities, Glencoe, Illinois, 1912, p. 16.
SOME COMMENTS ON WILLIAM L. KOLB'S "THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF CITIES" IN THE LIGHT OF INDIA'S URBANIZATION

Are India's Cities Going to Become "Industrial"?

Kolb's argument bases itself upon the assumption that the civilizations of "underdeveloped areas" such as India are destined "after all, to be industrial civilizations" (p. 41). This assumption must be questioned, especially if it means what it seems to mean, that the cities of such a country as India are going inevitably to become nucleated around centers of industry and communications (p. 41, note 24).

On the contrary, it seems reasonable to expect that most Indian cities will in the foreseeable future remain primarily nucleated around and concerned with commercial and productive activities of no more than moderate scale. Petty retailing rather than anything resembling an "industrial system" may be expected to dominate the urban picture for many generations to come. Competition for ecological dominance on the scale envisaged seems predictable at present for no more than a very few cities of India. The structural developments which Kolb foresees may occur, if anywhere, in these very few cities; their occurrence throughout Indian "civilization," or even in most Indian cities appears at present to be quite out of reach.

The achievement of large-scale industrialization and the establishment of a "welfare state" in India seem improbable for the visible future despite the announcement of such aims by local leaders and despite the effects of foreign aid. The "universalistic-ascriptive" ideals are proclaimed by politicos does not give reason to assume that they will be realized. It is questionable whether such ideals can be realized at all through local resources alone. Foreign aid to India has never been of great size in proportion to India's needs, and Point IV is now on the way to becoming .

Indian Evidence Supporting Kolb's Negative Predictions

Empirical support can readily be found in India for several of Kolb's cautions about accepting Western developments as models for the urban future of "underdeveloped areas."

(a) Kolb warns us that the sheer numerical density of a residential aggregate cannot alone induce a system of society emphasizing "universalistic-achievement" (p. 43). Thus villages in India have maintained in their dwelling areas for more than 2,000 years population densities greater than those found in much of modern Calcutta — without, of course, falling under the dominance of "universalistic-achievement" values.

(b) Kolb also warns us that heterogeneity of ethnic origins is not in itself a sufficient condition for urbanization of the Chicago variety (p. 43). For well over a millennium, villages all over India have probably contained an average of about ten different ethnic groups — castes — while towns and cities since ancient times have housed hundreds of such ethnic groups. Indian civilization long ago took ethnic heterogeneity in her cultural stride, and population density as well. Neither density nor heterogeneity can be counted among the new or socially dynamic factors in the process of urbanization in India. Thus to draw a new urban population even from a "single" Hindu hinterland is to guarantee that the population will be ethnically heterogeneous, not homogeneous (cf. p. 43, note 38).
(c) Kolb expects, or hopes, that primary groups will play a much larger part in maintaining social control in the cities of "underdeveloped" areas; he expects, or hopes, that secondary group controls typical of mass society in the urban West will remain less necessary (pp. 43-45).

That a kind of extended primary group organization has in fact remained strong — perhaps grown stronger — along with the growth of cities in India is attested by the lively existence of urban caste councils and associations.\(^1\) That most Indian urban dwellers maintain ties with rural family seats is attested by any number of reports. In a recent review of data on urban trends one Indian sociologist found himself unable to perceive any significant weakening either in caste divisions or in the structure of joint families.\(^2\)

On the other hand, secondary group organization in India is notoriously feeble. A thorough survey conducted recently in an old Indian state capital city of about 80,000 population discovered only sixty-three voluntary associations — ten Western-style "clubs" and fifty-three young men's wrestling "arenas."\(^3\) This amounts to less than one voluntary association per 1,200 persons; less than four per cent of the people of the city have contact with any secondary association. Artificial efforts to set up secondary associations such as trade unions and village panchayats that cut across primary caste and sectarian lines have met with slight success.\(^4\)

Kolb tells us that where "universalistic-achievement" values are weak, urban society may be able to continue largely under the control of primary groupings. Indian evidence indicates that this correlation may be correct, but that the implied sequence of causation should be reversed. In Indian cities it appears that because primary group organization is very strong, secondary controls and universalistic orientations are unable to develop.

"Particularistic-Achievement" is Likely to Continue

According to Kolb's analysis, the future cities of the "underdeveloped" areas must choose to develop toward one of two types of societies — that characterized by Parsons as "universalistic-achievement" (Chicago type) or that characterized by Parsons as "universalistic-ascription" (welfare state type) (p. 45).

Assuming that there may be empirical operations capable of validating the proximity of whole urban societies to Parsonian types, there remain difficulties in sorting out opposite kinds of evidence concerning urban societies in India. On the one hand, there can be no doubt that the government regards itself

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\(^3\) N. V. Sovani, op. cit., pp. 250-56.

\(^4\) Gardner Murphy, In the Minds of Men; the Study of Human Behavior and Social Tensions in India. New York, Basic Books, 1953, pp. 75-76, 95, 230.
as the potential architect of a welfare state, or that the masses of people talk as if they wanted that state to be built today. On the other hand, the urban evidence cited in the preceding section suggests that people in cities of India are in fact living according to a third Parsonian type of society, that of "particularistic-achievement." "Particularistic-achievement" is the Parsonian type most closely approximated by traditional Chinese society as it was characterized by M. Weber.\(^5\)

If one may use words somewhat recklessly, one may want to speculate as to whether rural society in India has not long approximated the "particularistic-achievement" type. Possibly certain ascriptive elements of village society have diminished in favor of urban standards of achievement. But surely there is strong continuity between village and city in the matter of "particularism." Primary groups of kinsmen and caste fellows do not dissolve into an urban mass in the cities of India; instead, they formalize their organization and enhance their distinctiveness. Their efforts to maintain their separate primary group cultures are the opposite — not the equivalent — of the effort to develop the "common purposes" of the universalistic urban community (p. 43). In the Indian city today, the multiple groups based upon "kinship" prevent and oppose the development of any general "neighborliness" — to paraphrase the implication of the citation from Wirth (p. 43).

In short, India's experiences with urbanization to date may persuade one to agree all the more heartily with Kolb's conclusion that "we ought not expect the cities of such areas to take on the characteristics of our early twentieth century cities" (p. 45). Nor ought we perhaps expect such cities to choose in their development among the same alternative paths as those which have seemed to lie before our own.

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THE CULTURAL ROLE OF CITIES

This paper has as its purpose to set forth a framework of ideas that may prove useful in research on the part played by cities in the development, decline, or transformation of culture. "Culture" is used as in anthropology. The paper contains no report of research done. It offers a scheme of constructs; it does not describe observed conditions or processes; references to particular cities or civilizations are illustrative and tentative.

Time Perspectives

The cultural role of cities may be considered from at least three different time perspectives. In the long-run perspective of human history as a single career,¹ the first appearance of cities marks a revolutionary change: the beginnings of civilization. Within this perspective cities remain the symbols and carriers of civilization wherever they appear. In fact the story of civilization may then be told as the story of cities — from those of the Ancient Near East through those of ancient Greece and Rome, medieval and modern Europe; and from Europe overseas to North and South America, Australia, the Far East, and back again to the modern Near East. In the short-run perspective we may study the cultural role of particular cities in relation to their local hinterlands of towns and villages.² The time span here is the several-year period of the field research or, at most, the lifespan of the particular cities that are studied. Between the long- and short-run perspectives, there is a middle-run perspective delimited by the life-history of the different civilizations within which cities have developed.³ This is the perspective adopted when we consider the cultural bearings of urbanization within Mexican civilization,⁴ or Chinese civi-

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² Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941. This study, short-run in description, also aims to test some general ideas.


⁴ Kroeber has recently discussed the problems of delimiting civilizations in his article, "The Delimitation of Civilizations," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XIV (1953).


⁵ Paul Kirchhoff, in "Four Hundred Years After: General Discussion of Acculturation, Social Change, and the Historical Provenience of Culture Elements," Heritage of Conquest by Sol Tax and others (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952), p. 254: "It seems to me that the fundamental characteristic of Mesoamerica was that it was a stratified society, one like ours or that of China, based on the axis of city and countryside. There was a native ruling class, with a class ideology and organization, which disappeared entirely; there were great cultural centers which, just as in our life, are so essential if you described the U. S. without New York, Chicago, etc., it would be absurd. The same thing happens
ilization or Indian civilization or Western civilization. It is a perspective usually of several thousand years and embraces within its orbit not just a particular city and its hinterland, but the whole pattern and sequence of urban development characteristic of a particular civilization and its cultural epochs.

While these three perspectives are clearly interrelated, research and analysis may concentrate primarily on one of them. Empirical ethnographic, sociological and geographical research on cities begins in the nature of the case with the short-run perspective, but the significance of such research increases as it becomes linked with ideas and hypotheses drawn from the other perspectives. One begins, say, with an empirical study of the origins, morphology, functions, and influence of an Asiatic city. Then one may go on to look at this city as a link in the interaction of two distinct civilizations, and see the problem of urbanization in Asia generally as a problem in Westernization, or the problem of Spanish-Indian acculturation of Mexico after the Conquest as a problem of de-urbanization and re-urbanization. Finally, the canvas may be further enlarged to show both Western and Eastern cities as variants of a single and continuing cultural and historical process. In this paper we propose to concentrate on the middle-run perspective, i.e., we shall analyze the role cities play in the formation, maintenance, spread, decline, and transformation of civilizations. We think that links with the long- and short-run perspectives will also emerge in the course of the analysis.

In the many useful studies of cities by urban geographers, sociologists, and ecologists we find frequent reference to "cultural functions" and "cultural centers." Under these rubrics they generally include the religious, educational, artistic centers and activities, and distinguish them from administrative, when you describe these centers in ancient Mexico. ... It's not only the arts, crafts and sciences which constitute the great changes, but the basic form of the culture changing from a city structure to the most isolated form, which is, in my opinion, the most total and radical change anywhere in history. ... When the city is cut off what is left over is attached as a subordinate to the new city-centered culture. ..."


(6) "Urbanization is part of the Europeanization that is spreading throughout the world," Mark Jefferson in reference (3) above. Kingsley Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, Princeton, 1951, pp. 148-49; M. Zinkin, Asia and the West, London, 1951, Ch. 1, "Eastern Village and Western City."

(7) Kirchhoff, op. cit.

(8) See for this approach the books of V. Gordon Childe, and his article in Town Planning Review, XXI (1950) on "The Urban Revolution."

military, economic centers and functions. This usage of "cultural" is too narrow for the purpose of a comparative analysis of the role cities play in the transformations of the more or less integrated traditional life of a community. Economic and political centers and activities may obviously play as great a role in these processes as the narrowly "cultural" ones. Moreover, these different kinds of centers and activities are variously combined and separated and it is these varying patterns that are significant. In ancient civilizations the urban centers were usually political-religious or political-intellectual; in the modern world they are economic.  

The mosque, the temple, the cathedral, the royal palace, the fortress, are the symbolic "centers" of the pre-industrial cities. The "central business district" has become symbolic of the modern urban center. In fact a cross-cultural history of cities might be written from the changing meanings of the words for city. "Civitas" in the Roman Empire meant an administrative or ecclesiastical district. Later, "city" was applied to the ecclesiastical center of a town — usually the cathedral. This usage still survives in names like "Île de la Cité" for one of the first centers of Paris. With the development of the "free cities," "city" came to mean the independent commercial towns with their own laws. The "city" of London is a financial center, and when Americans speak of "going to town" or "going downtown" they mean they are going to the "central business district." They usually think of any large city as a business and manufacturing center, whereas a Frenchman is more likely to regard his cities — certainly Paris — as "cultural centers."  

This symbolism is not of course a completely accurate designation of what goes on in the city for which it stands. The ecclesiastical centers were also in many cases centers of trade and of craftsmen, and the modern "central business district" is very apt to contain libraries, schools, art museums, government offices and churches, in addition to merchandising establishments and business offices. But allowing for this factual distortion, this symbolism does help us to separate two quite distinct cultural roles of cities, and provides a basis for classifying cities that is relevant to their cultural role. As a "central business district," the city is obviously a market-place, a place to buy and sell, "to do business" — to truck, barter and exchange with people who may be complete strangers and of different races, religions and creeds. The city here functions to work out largely impersonal relations among diverse cultural groups. As a religious or intellectual center, on the other hand, the city is a beacon for the faithful, a center for the learning, authority and perhaps doctrine that transforms the implicit "little traditions" of the local non-

(10) Gadgil, The Industrial Revolution of India in Recent Times, Oxford, 1944, pp. 6-12.  

P. George, La Ville, Paris, 1952.  

Fei Hsiao-Tung, China's Gentry, Essays in Rural-Urban Relations, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1953, pp. 91-117.  


(12) See article on "Urbanization" by W. M. Stewart in 14th edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica for some cultural variables in the definition of "city."
urban cultures into an explicit and systematic "great tradition." The varying cultural roles of cities, so separated and grouped into two contrasting kinds of roles with reference to the local traditions of the non-urban peoples, point to a distinction to which we shall soon return and to which we shall then give names.

Types of Cities

In the studies of economic historians (Pirenne, Dopsch) and in the studies of the currently significant factors for economic development (Hoselitz),¹³ the functions of cities are considered as they effect change; but the change chiefly in view is economic change. Our attention now turns to the roles of cities in effecting change in the content and integration of ideas, interests and ideals.

The distinction Hoselitz takes from Pirenne between political-intellectual urban centers on the one hand and economic centers on the other, points in the direction of the distinction necessary to us in taking up the new topic. But the distinction we need does not fully emerge until we refine the classification by (1) separating the political function from the intellectual and (2) giving new content to the term "intellectual." Delhi, Quito and Peiping are to be contrasted, as Hoselitz says, with Bombay, Guayaquil and Shanghai because the former three cities are "political-intellectual centers" and the latter three are "economic centers." (The contrast of Rio to São Paulo is less clear.) Let us now add that there are cities with political functions and without significant intellectual functions: New Delhi (if it be fair to separate it from old Delhi), Washington, D. C. and Canberra (the new university there may require a qualification). Further, the intellectual functions of Delhi, Quito and Peiping (and Kyoto, Lhasa, Cuzco, Mecca, medieval Liége and Uaxactun) are to develop, carry forward, elaborate a long-established cultural tradition local to the community in which those cities stand. These are the cities of the literati: clerics, astronomers, theologians, imams and priests. New Delhi and Washington, D. C. do not have, significantly, literati; in spite of its schools and universities Washington is not a city of great intellectual leadership; these are cities without major intellectual functions. In respect to this lack, New Delhi and Washington, D. C., belong with cities with predominately economic functions. On the other hand, not a few old cities with economic functions have also the functions associated with the literati (Florence, medieval Timbuktoo; Thebes).

We have taken into consideration, in this expanded grouping, both cities of the modern era and cities of the time before the development of a world economy. It may be useful now to separate the two historic periods, retaining the distinction between cities of the literati, cities of entrepreneurs, and cities of the bureaucracy. The following grouping results:

BEFORE THE UNIVERSAL OEKUMENE (pre-industrial revolution, pre-Western expansion)

1. Administrative-cultural cities
   (cities of the literati and the indigenous bureaucracy)
   Peiping
   Lhasa
   Uaxactun
   Kyoto
   Liége
   Allahabad (?)

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2. Cities of native commerce
   (cities of the entrepreneur)
   
   Bruges
   Marseilles
   Lübeck
   Market towns of native West Africa
   Early Canton

AFTER THE UNIVERSAL OEKUMENE (post-industrial revolution, and post-Western expansion)

3. Metropolis-cities of the world-wide managerial and entrepreneural class (Park's "cities of the main street of the world")
   
   London
   New York
   Osaka
   Yokahama
   Shanghai
   Singapore
   Bombay

Lesser cities and towns, also carrying on the world's business, may be added here.

4. Cities of modern administration
   (cities of the new bureaucracies)
   
   Washington, D. C.
   New Delhi
   Canberra

A thousand administrative towns, county seats, seats of British and French African colonial administration, etc.

What is the relationship of such a grouping to our topic: the role of cities in processes of cultural change?

The role of cities of Group 1 has already been stated. It is to carry forward, develop, elaborate a long-established local culture or civilization. These are cities that convert the folk culture into its civilized dimension.

But the cities of groups 2, 3, and 4 do not have, or do not have conspicuously and as their central effect, this role in the cultural process. They affect the cultural process in other ways. How? They are cities in which one or both of the following things are true: (1) the prevailing relationships of people and the prevailing common understandings have to do with the technical not the moral order, with administrative regulation, business and technical convenience; (2) these cities are populated by people of diverse cultural origins removed from the indigenous seats of their cultures.

They are cities in which new states of mind, following from these characteristics, are developed and become prominent. The new states of mind are indifferent to or inconsistent with, or supersede or overcome, states of mind associated with local cultures and ancient civilizations. The intellectuals of these three groups of cities, if any, are intelligentsia rather than literati.

(14) Robert Redfield, The Primitive World and Its Transformations, Ch. 3.
(15) Ibid, Ch. 3.
The distinction that is then basic to consideration of the cultural role of cities is the distinction between the carrying forward into systematic and reflective dimensions an old culture and the creating of original modes of thought that have authority beyond or in conflict with old cultures and civilizations. We might speak of the orthogenetic cultural role of cities as contrasted with the heterogenetic cultural role.

In both these roles the city is a place in which cultural change takes place. The roles differ as to the character of the change. Insofar as the city has an orthogenetic role, it is not to maintain culture as it was; the orthogenetic city is not static; it is the place where religious, philosophical and literary specialists reflect, synthesize and create out of the traditional material new arrangements and developments that are felt by the people to be outgrowths of the old. What is changed is a further statement of what was there before. Insofar as the city has a heterogenetic role, it is a place of conflict of differing traditions, a center of heresy, heterodoxy and dissent, of interruption and destruction of ancient tradition, of rootlessness and anomie. Cities are both these things, and the same events may appear to particular people or groups to be representative of what we here call orthogenesis or representative of heterogenesis. The predominating trend may be in one of the two directions, and so allow us to characterize the city, or that phase of the history of the city, as the one or the other. The lists just given suggest that the differences in the degree to which in the city orthogenesis or heterogenesis prevails are in cases strongly marked.

The presence of the market is not of itself a fact of heterogenetic change. Regulated by tradition, maintained by such customs and routines as develop over long periods of time, the market may flourish without heterogenetic change. In the medieval Muslim town we see an orthogenetic city; the market and the keeper of the market submitted economic activities to explicit cultural and religious definition of the norms. In Western Guatemala the people who come to market hardly communicate except with regard to buying and selling, and the market has little heterogenetic role. On the other hand the market in many instances provides occasions when men of diverse traditions may come to communicate and to differ; and also in the market occurs that exchange on the basis of universal standards of utility which is neutral to particular moral orders and in some sense hostile to all of them. The cities of Group 2, therefore, are cities unfavorable to orthogenetic change but not necessarily productive of heterogenetic change.

The City and the Folk Society

The folk society may be conceived as that imagined combination of societal elements which would characterize a long-established, homogeneous, isolated and non-literate integral (self-contained) community; the folk culture is that society seen as a system of common understandings. Such a society can be approximately realized in a tribal band or village; it cannot be approximately realized in a city. What are characteristics of the city that may be conceived as a contrast to those of the folk society?

The city may be imagined as that community in which orthogenetic and heterogenetic transformations of the folk society have most fully occurred. The former has brought about the Great Tradition and its special intellectual class, administrative officers and rules closely derived from the moral and religious life of the people. The latter has been represented in the folk society by the individual with his own particular idiosyncratic moral code, the deviant, the heretic, the maverick, the man of ideas and innovation.

life of the local culture, and advanced economic institutions, also obedient to these local cultural controls. The heterogenetic transformations have accomplished the freeing of the intellectual, esthetic, economic and political life from the local moral norms, and have developed on the one hand an individuated expediential motivation, and on the other a revolutionary, nativistic, humanistic or ecumenical viewpoint, now directed toward reform, progress and designed change.

As these two aspects of the effects of the city on culture may be in part incongruent with each other, and as in fact we know them to occur in different degrees and arrangements in particular cities, we may now review the classification of cities offered above so as to recognize at least two types of cities conceived from this point of view:

A. The city of orthogenetic transformation: the city of the moral order; the city of culture carried forward. In the early civilizations the first cities were of this kind and usually combined this developmental cultural function with political power and administrative control. But it is to be emphasized that this combination occurred because the local moral and religious norms prevailed and found intellectual development in the literati and exercise of control of the community in the ruler and the laws. Some of these early cities combined these two "functions" with commerce and economic production; others had little of these. It is as cities of predominating orthogenetic civilization that we are to view Peiping, Lhasa, Uaxactun, fourteenth-century Liége.

B. The city of heterogenetic transformation: the city of the technical order; the city where local cultures are disintegrated and new integrations of mind and society are developed of the kinds described above ("The heterogenetic role of cities"). In cities of this kind men are concerned with the market, with "rational" organization of production of goods, with expediential relations between buyer and seller, ruler and ruled, and native and foreigner. In this kind of city the predominant social types are businessmen, administrators alien to those they administer, and rebels, reformers, planners and plotters of many varieties. It is in cities of this kind that priority comes to be given to economic growth and the expansion of power among the goods of life. The modern metropolis exhibits very much of this aspect of the city; the town built in the tropics by the United Fruit Company and the city built around the Russian uranium mine must have much that represents it; the towns of the colonial administration in Africa must show many of its features. Indeed, in one way or another, all the cities of groups 2, 3 and 4 (supra) are cities of the technical order, and are cities favorable to heterogenetic transformation of the moral order.¹⁷

This type of city may be subdivided into the administrative city, city of the bureaucracy (Washington, D. C., Canberra), and the city of the entrepreneur (Hamburg, Shanghai). Of course many cities exhibit both characteristics.

"In every tribal settlement there is civilization; in every city is the folk society." We may look at any city and see within it the folk society insofar as ethnic communities that make it up preserve folklike characteristics, and we may see in a town in ancient Mesopotamia or in aboriginal West Africa a half-

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¹⁷ In the heterogenetic transformation the city and its hinterland become mutually involved: the conservative or reactionary prophet in the country inveighs against the innovations or backslidings of the city; and the reformer with the radically progressive message moves back from Medina against Mecca, or enters Jerusalem.
way station between folk society and orthogenetic civilization. We may also see in every city its double urban characteristics: we may identify the institutions and mental habits there prevailing with the one or the other of the two lines of transformation of folk life which the city brings about. The heterogeneous transformations have grown with the course of history, and the development of modern industrial world-wide economy, together with the great movements of peoples and especially those incident to the expansion of the West, have increased and accelerated this aspect of urbanization. The later cities are predominantly cities of the technical order. We see almost side by side persisting cities of the moral order and those of the technical order: Peiping and Shanghai, Cuzco and Guayaquil, a native town in Nigeria and an administrative post and railway center hard by.

The ancient city, predominantly orthogenetic, was not (as remarked by W. Eberhard) in particular cases the simple outgrowth of a single pre-civilized culture, but was rather (as in the case of Loyang) a city in which conquered and conqueror lived together, the conqueror extending his tradition over the conquered, or accepting the latter's culture. What makes the orthogenetic aspect of a city is the integration and uniform interpretation of preceding culture, whether its origins be one or several. Salt Lake City and early Philadelphia, cities with much orthogenetic character, were established by purposive acts of founders. Salt Lake City created its own hinterland on the frontier (as pointed out by C. Harris). Other variations on the simple pattern of origin and development of a city from an established folk people can no doubt be adduced.

Transformation of Folk Societies: Primary Urbanization and Secondary Urbanization

The preceding account of different types of cities is perhaps satisfactory as a preliminary, but their cultural roles in the civilizations which they represent cannot be fully understood except in relation to the entire pattern of urbanization within that civilization, i.e., the number, size, composition, distribution, duration, sequence, morphology, function, rates of growth and decline, and the relation to the countryside and to each other of the cities within a civilization. Such information is rare for any civilization. In the present state of our knowledge it may be useful to guide further inquiry by assuming two hypothetical patterns of urbanization: primary and secondary. In the primary phase a precivilized folk society is transformed by urbanization into a peasant society and correlated urban center. It is primary in the sense that the peoples making up the precivilized folk more or less share a common culture which remains the matrix too for the peasant and urban cultures which develop from it in the course of urbanization. Such a development, occurring slowly in communities not radically disturbed, tends to produce a "sacred culture" which is gradually transmuted by the literati of the cities into a "Great Tradition." Primary urbanization thus takes place almost entirely within the framework of a core culture that develops, as the local cultures become urbanized and transformed, into an indigenous civilization. This core culture dominates the civilization despite occasional intrusions of foreign peoples and cultures. When the encounter with other peoples and civilizations is too rapid and intense an indigenous civilization may be destroyed by de-urbanization or be

(18) This distinction is an extension of the distinction between the primary and secondary phases of folk transformations in Redfield, The Primitive World and Its Transformations, p. 41.
This leads to the secondary pattern of urbanization: the case in which a folk society, precivilized, peasant, or partly urbanized, is further urbanized by contact with peoples of widely different cultures from that of its own members. This comes about through expansion of a local culture, now partly urbanized, to regions inhabited by peoples of different cultures, or by the invasion of a culture-civilization by alien colonists or conquerors. This secondary pattern produces not only a new form of urban life in some part in conflict with local folk cultures but also new social types in both city and country. In the city appear "marginal" and "cosmopolitan" men and an "intelligentsia"; in the country various types of marginal folk: enclavel-, minority-, imperialized, transplanted-, remade-, quai-folk, etc., depending on the kind of relation to the urban center.

This discussion takes up a story of the contact of peoples at the appearance of cities. But, here parenthetically, it is necessary to note that even before the appearance of cities the relations between small and primitive communities may be seen as on the one hand characterized by common culture and on the other by mutual usefulness with awareness of cultural difference. The "primary phase of urbanization" is a continuation of the extension of common culture from a small primitive settlement to a town and its hinterland, as no doubt could be shown for parts of West Africa. The "secondary phase of urbanization" is begun, before cities, in the institutions of travel and trade among local communities with different cultures. In Western Guatemala today simple Indian villagers live also in a wider trade-community of pluralistic cultures; we do not know to what extent either the pre-Columbian semi-urban centers or the cities of the Spanish-modern conquerors and rulers, have shaped this social system; it may be that these people were already on the way to secondary urbanization before any native religious and political center rose to prominence.

While we do not know universal sequences within primary or secondary urbanization, it is likely that the degree to which any civilization is characterized by patterns of primary or secondary urbanization depends on the rate of technical development and the scope and intensity of contact with other cultures. If technical development is slow and the civilization is relatively isolated, we may expect to find a pattern of primary urbanization prevailing. If, on the other hand, technical development is rapid and contacts multiple and intense, secondary urbanization will prevail.

It may be that in the history of every civilization there is, of necessity, secondary urbanization. In modern Western civilization conditions are such as to make secondary urbanization the rule. But even in older civilizations it is not easy to find clear-cut examples of primary urbanization — because of multiple interactions, violent fluctuations in economic and military fortunes, conflicts and competition among cities and dynasties, and the raids of nomads. The Maya before the Spanish Conquest are perhaps a good example of primary urbanization. The cases of the Roman, Greek, Hindu, Egyptian and Mesopotamian.
tamian civilizations, although characterized by distinctive indigenous civilizations, are nevertheless complex because little is known about the degree of cultural homogeneity of the peoples who formed the core cultures and because as these civilizations became imperial they sought to assimilate more and more diverse peoples. Alternatively the irritant "seed" of a city may have been sown in some of them by the conquering raid of an outside empire, the desire to copy another empire in having a capital, or simple theft from another people — with the subsequent development around this seed of the "pearl" of a relatively indigenous, primary urban growth, sending out its own imperial secondary strands in due time. Thus while Rome, Athens, Chang-An and Loyang in early China and Peiping in later, Patapiluta and Benares, Memphis and Thebes, Nippur and Ur, may have been for a time at least symbolic vehicles for loyalty to the respective empires and indigenous civilizations, it was not these relatively "orthogenetic" cities but the mixed cities on the periphery of an empire — the "colonial cities" which carried the core culture to other peoples. And in such cities, usually quite mixed in character, the imperial great tradition was not only bound to be very dilute but would also have to meet the challenge of conflicting local traditions. At the imperial peripheries, primary urbanization turns into secondary urbanization.22

Similar trends can be perceived in modern times: Russian cities in Southern Europe and Asia appear to be very mixed,23 non-Arabic Muslim cities have developed in Africa and South Asia, and the colonial cities of the European powers admit native employees daily at the doors of their skyscraper banks. Possibly the nuclear cultures are homogeneous andcreate indigenous civilizations but as they expand into new areas far afield from the home cultures they have no choice but to build "heterogenetic" cities.

Modern "colonial" cities (e.g., Jakarta, Manila, Saigon, Bangkok, Singapore, Calcutta) raise the interesting question whether they can reverse from the "heterogenetic" to the "orthogenetic" role. For the last one hundred or more years they have developed as the outposts of imperial civilizations, but as the countries in which they are located achieve political independence, will the cities change their cultural roles and contribute more to the formation of a civilization indigenous to their areas? Many obstacles lie in the path of such a course. These cities have large, culturally diverse populations, not necessarily European, for example, the Chinese in Southeast Asia, Muslims and Hindu refugees from faraway provinces, in India; they often have segregated ethnic quarters, and their established administrative, military and economic functions are not easily changed. Many new problems have been created by a sudden influx of postwar refugee populations, and the cities' changing positions in national and global political and economic systems. While many of these colonial cities have been centers of nationalism and of movements for revival

(22) The case of China is particularly striking, since the evidence for a dominant core culture is unmistakable but its relation to local cultures which may have been its basis is unknown. See Chi Li, The Formation of the Chinese People, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928, and Wolfram Eberhard, Early Chinese Cultures and their Development, Smithsonian Institution Annual Report, 1937, Washington, 1938.

For a good study of imperial "spread" and "dilution," see A. H. M. Jones, The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian, Oxford, 1940.

of the local cultures, they are not likely to live down their "heterogenetic" past.  

The Cultural Consequences of Primary and Secondary Urbanization

The discussion of primary and secondary urbanization above has been a bare outline. It may be filled in by reference to some postulated consequences of each type of process. The most important cultural consequence of primary urbanization is the transformation of the Little Tradition into a Great Tradition. Embodied in "sacred books" or "classics," sanctified by a cult, expressed in monuments, sculpture, painting, and architecture, served by the other arts and sciences, the Great Tradition becomes the core culture of an indigenous civilization and a source, consciously examined, for defining its moral, legal, aesthetic and other cultural norms. A Great Tradition describes a way of life and as such is a vehicle and standard for those who share it to identify with one another as members of a common civilization. In terms of social structure, a significant event is the appearance of literati, those who represent the Great Tradition. The new forms of thought that now appear and extend themselves include reflective and systematic thought; the definition of fixed ideasystems (theologies, legal codes); the development of esoteric or otherwise generally inaccessible intellectual products carried forward, now in part separate from the tradition of the folk; and the creation of intellectual and aesthetic forms that are both traditional and original (cities of the Italian Renaissance; development of "rococo" Maya sculpture in the later cities).

In government and administration the orthogenesis of urban civilization is represented by chiefs, rulers and laws that express and are closely controlled by the norms of the local culture. The chief of the Crow Indians, in a pre-civilized society, and the early kings of Egypt, were of this type. The Chinese emperor was in part orthogenetically controlled by the Confucian teaching and ethic; in some part he represented a heterogenetic development. The Roman pro-consul and the Indian Service of the United States, especially in certain phases, were more heterogenetic political developments.

Economic institutions of local cultures and civilizations may be seen to be orthogenetic insofar as the allocation of resources to production and distribution for consumption are determined by the traditional system of status and by the traditional specific local moral norms. The chief's yam house in the Trobriands is an accumulation of capital determined by these cultural factors. In old China the distribution of earnings and "squeeze" were distributed according to familial obligations: these are orthogenetic economic institutions and practices. The market, freed from controls of tradition, status and moral rule, becomes the world-wide heterogenetic economic institution.

In short, the trend of primary urbanization is to co-ordinate political, economic, educational, intellectual and aesthetic activity to the norms provided by the Great Traditions.

The general consequence of secondary urbanization is the weakening or supersession of the local and traditional cultures by states of mind that are

incongruent with those local cultures. Among these are to be recognized:

1. The rise of a consensus appropriate to the technical order: i.e., based on self-interest and pecuniary calculation, or on recognition of obedience to common impersonal controls, characteristically supported by sanctions of force. (This in contrast to a consensus based on common religious and non-expediential moral norms.) There is also an autonomous development of norms and standards for the arts, crafts, and sciences.

2. The appearance of new sentiments of common cause attached to groups drawn from culturally heterogeneous backgrounds. In the city proletariats are formed and class or ethnic consciousness is developed, and also new professional and territorial groups. The city is the place where ecumenical religious reform is preached (though it is not originated there). It is the place where nationalism flourishes. On the side of social structure, the city is the place where new and larger groups are formed that are bound by few and powerful common interests and sentiments in place of the complexly interrelated roles and statuses that characterize the groups of local, long-established culture. Among social types that appear in this aspect of the cultural process in the city are the reformer, the agitator, the nativistic or nationalistic leader, the tyrant and his assassin, the missionary and the imported school teacher.

3. The instability of viewpoint as to the future, and emphasis on prospective rather than retrospective view of man in the universe. In cities of predominantly orthogenetic influence, people look to a future that will repeat the past (either by continuing it or by bringing it around again to its place in the cycle). In cities of predominantly heterogenetic cultural influence there is a disposition to see the future different from the past. It is this aspect of the city that gives rise to reform movements, forward-looking myths, and planning, revolutionary or mellioristic. The forward-looking may be optimistic and radically reformistic; it may be pessimistic, escapist, defeatist or apocalyptic. In the city there are Utopias and counter-Utopias. Insofar as these new states of mind are secular, worldly, they stimulate new political and social aspiration and give rise to policy.

Consequences for World View, Ethos, and Typical Personality

The difference in the general cultural consequences of primary and secondary urbanization patterns may be summarily characterized by saying that in primary urbanization, all phases of the technical order (material technology, economy, government, arts, crafts, and sciences) are referred, in theory at least, to the standards and purposes of a moral order delineated in the Great Tradition, whereas in secondary urbanization different phases of the technical order are freed from this reference and undergo accelerated autonomous developments. With respect to this development, the moral order, or rather orders, for there are now many competing ones, appears to lag.25

There is another way of describing these differences: in terms of the consequences of the two kinds of urbanization for changes in world view, ethos, and typical personality.26 To describe the consequences in these terms is to describe them in their bearings and meanings for the majority of individual


(26) For a further discussion of these concepts, see Redfield, ibid., Ch. 4, and Redfield, The Little Community, University of Chicago Press (forthcoming), Chs. 5 and 6 on personality and mental outlook.
selves constituting the society undergoing urbanization. We now ask, how do primary and secondary urbanization affect mental outlook, values and attitudes, and personality traits? These are in part psychological questions, for they direct our attention to the psychological aspects of broad cultural processes.

There are many accounts of the psychological consequences of urbanization. These have described the urban outlook, ethos, and personality as depersonalized, individualized, emotionally shallow and atomized, unstable, secularized, blase, rationalistic, cosmopolitan, highly differentiated, self-critical, time-coordinated, subject to sudden shifts in mood and fashion, "other-directed," etc. The consensus in these descriptions and their general acceptance by social scientists seems great enough to indicate that there probably is a general psychological consequence of urbanization, although it cannot be precisely described and proven. We should, however, like to suggest that the "urban way of life" that is described in the characterizations to which we refer is primarily a consequence of secondary urbanization and of that in a particular critical stage when personal and cultural disorganization are greatest. To see these consequences in perspective, it is necessary to relate them on the one hand to the consequences of primary urbanization and on the other to those situations of secondary urbanization that produce new forms of personal and cultural integration. Most of all it is necessary to trace the continuities as well as the discontinuities in outlook, values, and personality, as we trace the transformation of folk societies into their civilized dimension. The "peasant" is a type that represents an adjustment between the values of the precivilized tribe and those of the urbanite. The "literati" who fashion a Great Tradition do not repudiate the values and outlook of their rural hinterland but systematize and elaborate them under technical specialization. The cosmopolitan "intelligencia" and "sophists" of the metropolitan centers have a prototype in the "heretic" of the indigenous civilization. And even the most sophisticated urban centers are not without spiritualists, astrologers and other practitioners with links to a folk-like past.

The connections between the folk culture, the Great Tradition, and the sophisticated culture of the heterogenous urban centers can be traced not only in the continuities of the historical sequence of a particular group of local cultures becoming urbanized and de-urbanized, but they also can be traced in the development of two distinct forms of cultural consciousness which appear in these transformations.


(28) Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan, Ch. 11; R. E. Park, "Magic, Mentality, and City Life," reprinted in Park, Human Communities.


Cultural Integration Between City and Country

From what has been said about primary and secondary urbanization it follows that city and country are more closely integrated, culturally, in the primary phase of urbanization than in the secondary phase. Where the city has grown out of a local culture, the country people see its ways as in some important part a form of their own, and they feel friendlier toward the city than do country people ruled by a proconsul from afar. The stereotype of "the wicked city" will be stronger in the hinterlands of the heterogenetic cities than in those of the orthogenetic cities. Many of these are sacred centers of faith, learning, justice and law.

Nevertheless, even in primary urbanization a cultural gap tends to grow between city and country. The very formation of the Great Tradition introduces such a gap. The literati of the city develop the values and world view of the local culture to a degree of generalization, abstraction and complexity incomprehensible to the ordinary villager, and in doing so leave out much of the concrete local detail of geography and village activity. The Maya Indian who lived in some rural settlement near Uaxactun could not have understood the calendrical intricacies worked out in that shrine-city by the priests; and the rituals performed at the city-shrine had one high level of meaning for the priest and another lower meaning, connecting with village life at some points only, for the ordinary Indian.

On the other hand, primary urbanization involves the development of characteristic institutions and societal features that hold together, in a certain important measure of common understanding, the Little Tradition and the Great Tradition. We may refer to the development of these institutions and societal features as the universalization of cultural consciousness — meaning by "universalization," the preservation and extension of common understanding as to the meaning and purpose of life, and sense of belonging together, to all the people, rural or urban, of the larger community. Some of the ways in which this universalization takes place are suggested in the following paragraphs. The examples are taken chiefly from India; they probably have considerable cross-cultural validity.

1. The embodiment of the Great Tradition in "sacred books" and secondarily in sacred monuments, art, icons, etc. Such "sacred scriptures" may be in a language not widely read or understood; nevertheless they may become a fixed point for the worship and ritual of ordinary people. The place of the "Torah" in the lives of Orthodox Jews, the Vedas among orthodox Hindus, the "Three Baskets" for Buddhists, the thirteen classics for Confucianists, the Koran for Muslims, the stelac and temples of the ancient Maya, are all examples of such sacred scriptures, although they may vary in degree of sacredness and in canonical status.

2. The development of a special class of "literati" (priests, rabbis, Imams, Brahmins) who have the authority to read, interpret, and comment on the sacred scriptures. Thus the village Brahmin who reads the Gita for villagers at ceremonies mediates a part of the Great Tradition of Hinduism for them.

The mediation of a great tradition is not always this direct. At the village level it may be carried in a multitude of ways — by the stories parents and grandparents tell children, by professional reciters and storytellers, by dramatic performances and dances, in songs and proverbs, etc.

In India the epics and puranas have been translated into the major
regional languages and have been assimilated to the local cultures. This interaction of a "great tradition" and the "little tradition" of local and regional cultures needs further study, especially in terms of the professional and semi-professional "mediators" of the process.

3. The role of leading personalities who because they themselves embody or know some aspects of a Great Tradition succeed through their personal position as leaders in mediating a Great Tradition to the masses of people. There is a vivid account of this process in Jawaharlal Nehru's Discovery of India, in which he describes first how he "discovered" the Great Tradition of Indian in the ruins of Mohenjo-Daro and other archeological monuments, her sacred rivers and holy cities, her literature, philosophy, and history. And then he describes how he discovered the "little traditions" of the people and the villages, and how through his speeches he conveyed to them a vision of Bharat Mata — Mother India — that transcended the little patches of village land, people, and customs.29

4. Nehru's account suggests that actual physical places, buildings and monuments — especially as they become places of sacred or patriotic pilgrimage — are important means to a more universalized cultural consciousness and the spread of a Great Tradition. In India this has been and still is an especially important universalizing force. The sanctity of rivers and the purifying powers of water go all the way back to the Rig Veda. The Buddhists—who may have started the practice of holy pilgrimages — believed that there were four places that the believing man should visit with awe and reverence: Buddha's birth place, the site where he attained illumination or perfect insight, the place where the mad elephant attacked him, and the place where Buddha died. In the Mahabharta, there is a whole book on the subject of holy places (Aranyaka Book). Even a sinner who is purified by holy water will go to heaven. And the soul ready for moksha will surely achieve it if the pilgrim dies on a pilgrimage.30 Today the millions of pilgrims who flock to such preeminent holy spots as Allahabad or Banaras create problems of public safety and urban over-crowding, but they, like Nehru, are also discovering the Bharat Mata beyond their villages.

In India "sacred geography" has also played an important part in determining the location and layout of villages and cities and in this way has created a cultural continuity between countryside and urban centers. In ancient India, at least, every village and every city had a "sacred center" with temple, tank, and garden. And the trees and plants associated with the sacred shrine were also planted in private gardens, for the households too had their sacred center; the house is the "body" of a spirit (Varta Purusha) just as the human body is the "house" of the soul.31

At each of these levels — of household, village, and city — the "sacred

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(30) D. Patil, Cultural History from the Vāya Purāna, Poona, 1946, Appendix B.
center" provides the forum, the vehicle, and the content for the formation of distinct cultural identities — of families, village, and city. But as individuals pass outward, although their contacts with others become less intimate and less frequent, they nevertheless are carried along by the continuity of the "sacred centers," feeling a consciousness of a single cultural universe where people hold the same things sacred, and where the similarities of civic obligations in village and city to maintain tanks, build public squares, plant fruit trees, erect platforms and shrines, is concrete testimony to common standards of virtue and responsibility.

Surely such things as these — a "sacred scripture," and a sacred class to interpret it, leading personalities, "sacred geography" and the associated rites and ceremonies — must in any civilization be important vehicles for the formation of that common cultural consciousness from which a Great Tradition is fashioned and to which it must appeal if it is to stay alive. It is in this sense that the universalization of cultural consciousness is a necessary ingredient in its formation and maintenance. Moreover, as the discussion of the role of "sacred geography" in the formation of Hinduism has intimated, this process does not begin only at the point where the villager and the urbanite merge their distinct cultural identities in a higher identity, but is already at work at the simpler levels of family, caste and village, and must play an important part in the formation and maintenance of the Little Tradition at these levels.32


J. M. Linton Bogle, Town Planning in India, Oxford University Press, 1929.

Mudgett and others, Banaras: Outline of a Master Plan, prepared by Town and Village Planning Office, Lucknow.

(32) See Robert Redfield, The Little Community, (ms, to be published 1954) Ch. 8, on the little community "As a community within communities."

In addition to the above factors, it has been usual to single out special items of content of the world view and values of a Great Tradition as explanations of the "Universalization" of Great Traditions. It has been frequently argued, e.g., that religions which are monotheistic and sanction an "open class" social system will appeal more to ordinary people and spread faster than those which are polytheistic and which sanction "caste" systems. (See e.g., H. J. Kissling, "The sociological and educational role of the Dervish orders in the Ottoman Empire," in G. von Grunebaum (ed.), Studies in Islamic Cultural History.) F. S. C. Northrop and Arnold Toynbee both attach great importance to the ideological content of cultures as factors in their spread, although they come out with different results. It may be that such special features of content are important in the formation and spread of some particular religions at some particular time, but it is doubtful that they would have the same role in different civilizations under all circumstances. In his recent study of the Coorgs of South India, Srinivas argues with considerable plausibility that the spread of Hinduism on an all-India basis has depended on its polytheism, which has made it easy to incorporate all sorts of alien deities, and on a caste system which assimilates every new cultural or ethnic group as a special caste.28

Another difficulty about using special features of content of some partic-
The integration of city and country in the secondary phase of urbanization cannot rest on a basic common cultural consciousness or a common culture, for there is none. Rural-urban integration in this phase of urbanization rests primarily on the mutuality of interests and on the "symbiotic" relations that have often been described.33 The city is a "service station" and amusement center for the country, and the country is a "food basket" for the city. But while the diversity of cultural groups and the absence of a common culture makes the basis of the integration primarily technical, even this kind of integration requires a kind of cultural consciousness to keep it going. We refer to the consciousness of cultural differences and the feeling that certain forms of inter-cultural association are of great enough benefit to override the repugnance of dealing with "foreigners." We may call this an "enlargement of cultural horizons sufficient to become aware of other cultures and of the possibility that one's own society may in some ways require their presence. To paraphrase Adam Smith, it is not to the interest of the (Jewish) baker, the (Turkish) carpet-dealer, the (French) hand laundry, that the American Christian customer looks when he patronizes them, but to his own.

This is the practical psychological basis for admission of the stranger and tolerance of foreign minorities, even at the level of the folk society.34 In a quotation from the Institutions of Athens, which Toynbee has, perhaps ironically, titled "Liberté-Egalité-Fraternité," we are told that the reason why Athens has "extended the benefits of Democracy to the relations between slaves and freemen and between aliens and citizens" is that "the country requires permanent residence of aliens in her midst on account both of the multiplicity of trades and of her maritime activities."35

When all or many classes of a population are culturally strange to each other and where some of the city populations are culturally alien to the country populations, the necessity for an enlarged cultural consciousness is obvious. In societies where social change is slow, and there has developed an adjustment of mutual usefulness and peaceful residence side by side of groups culturally different but not too different, the culturally complex society may be relatively stable.36 But where urban development is great, such conditions

34 Robert Redfield, The Primitive World and Its Transformations, pp. 33-34, for the institutionalization of hospitality to strangers in peasant societies.
36 Redfield, "Primitive Merchants of Guatemala."
are apt to be unstable. Each group may be perennially affronted by the beliefs and practices of the other groups. Double standards of morality will prevail, since each cultural group will have one code for its "own kind" and another for the "outsiders." This simultaneous facing both inward and outward puts a strain on both codes. There may then be present the drives to proselitize, to withdraw and dig in, to persecute and to make scapegoats; there may even be fear of riot and massacre. In such circumstances the intellectuals become the chief exponents of a "cosmopolitan" enlarged cultural consciousness, inventing formulas of universal toleration and the benefits of mutual understanding, and extolling the freedom to experiment in different ways of life. But they do not always prevail against the more violent and unconvinced crusaders for some brand of cultural purity.

In primary urbanization when technical development was quite backward, a common cultural consciousness did get formed. The travelling student, teacher, saint, pilgrim or even humble villager who goes to the next town may be startled by strange and wonderful sights, but throughout his journey he is protected by the compass of the common culture from cultural shock and disorientation. In ancient times students and teachers came from all over India and even from distant countries to study at Taxila, just as they came from all over Greece to Athens. In secondary urbanization, especially under modern conditions, technical developments in transportation, travel and communication enormously facilitate and accelerate cultural contacts. The effects of this on common cultural consciousness are not easy briefly to characterize. They make the more traditional cultural differences less important. They provide a wide basis of common understanding with regard to the instruments and practical means of living. It is at least clear that the integration of country and city that results is not the same kind of sense of common purpose in life that was provided to rural-urban peoples through the institutions mediating Little and Great Traditions referred to above. At this point the enquiry approaches the questions currently asked about the "mass culture" of modern great societies.

Cities as Centers of Cultural Innovation, Diffusion, and Progress

It is a commonly stated view that the city rather than the country is the source of cultural innovations, that such innovations diffuse outward from city to country, and that the "spread" is more or less inverse to distance from the urban center. The objection to this view is not that it is wrong — for there is much information to show that it is. The objection is that it is too simple and that the "core" of a culture may be relatively fixed and the "diffusion" may as well be called a "provisional importation" as a "spread." Cultural changes may be spread so that they are not noticeable, or they may be spread so that they are not readily apparent. Cultural changes may also be spread so that they are not quickly evident, or they may be spread so that they are not readily observable.

(37) P. Sorokin and C. Zimmerman, Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1929, Ch. 17, "The role of the city and the country in innovation, disruption, and preservation of the national culture."


R. E. Park, "The urban community as a spatial pattern and a moral order," "Newspaper circulation and metropolitan regions," both reprinted in Park, Human Communities.
is much evidence that would seem to support it — but that the limits and conditions of its validity need to be specified. It seems to assume for example that in the processes of cultural change, innovation, and diffusion, "city" and "country" are fixed points of reference which do not have histories, or interact, and are not essentially related to larger contexts of cultural change. Yet such assumptions — if ever true — would hold only under the most exceptional and short-run conditions. It is one thing to say that a large metropolitan city is a "center" of cultural innovation and diffusion for its immediate hinterland at a particular time; it is another to ask how that center itself was formed, over how long a period and from what stimuli. In other words, as we enlarge the time span, include the rise and fall of complex distributions of cities, allow for the mutual interactions between them and their hinterlands, and also take account of interactions with other civilizations and their rural-urban patterns, we find that the processes of cultural innovation and "flow" are far too complex to be handled by simple mechanical laws concerning the direction, rate, and "flow" of cultural diffusion between "city" and "country." The cities themselves are creatures as well as creators of this process, and it takes a broad cross-cultural perspective to begin to see what its nature is. While this perspective may not yield simple generalizations about direction and rates of cultural diffusion to widen the viewpoint as here suggested may throw some light on the processes of cultural change, including the formation and cultural "influence" of cities.

In a primary phase of urbanization, when cities are developing from folk societies, it seems meaningless to assert, e.g., that the direction of cultural flow is from city to country. Under these conditions a folk culture is transformed into an urban culture which is a specialization of it, and if we wish to speak of "direction of flow" it would make more sense to see the process as one of a series of concentrations and nucleations within a common field. And as these concentrations occur, the common "Little Tradition" has not become inert; in fact, it may retain a greater vitality and disposition to change than the systematized Great Tradition that gets "located" in special classes and in urban centers. From this point of view the spatial and mechanical concepts of "direction" and "rate" of flow, etc., are just metaphors of the processes involved in the formation of a Great Tradition. The cultural relations between city and country have to be traced in other terms, in terms of socio-cultural history and of cultural-psychological processes. Physical space and time may be important obstacles and facilitators to these processes but they are not the fundamental determinants of cultural "motion" as they are of physical motion.

Under conditions of secondary urbanization, the spatial and mechanical concepts seem more appropriate because people and goods are more mobile and the technical development of the channels of transportation and communication is such as to permit highly precise measurement of their distributions and of "flows." But here too we may be measuring only some physical facts whose cultural significance remains indeterminate, or, at most, we may be documenting only a particularly recent cultural tendency to analyze intercultural relations in quantitative, abstract, and non-cultural terms. The assumption of a continuous and quantitatively divisible "diffusion" from a fixed urban center is unrealistic.

We may see Canton or Calcutta as a center for the diffusion of Western culture into the "East." We may also see these cities as relatively recent

Hiller, "Extension of urban characteristics into rural areas," Rural Sociology, Vol. 6 (1941).
metropolitan growths, beginning as minor outliers of Oriental civilizations and then attracting both foreign and also uprooted native peoples, varying in fortune with world-wide events, and becoming at last not so much a center for the introduction of Western ways as a center for nativistic and independence movements to get rid of Western control and dominance. "Everything new happens at Canton," is said in China. We have in such a case not simple diffusion, or spread of urban influence from a city, but rather a cultural interaction which takes place against a background of ancient civilization with its own complex and changing pattern of urbanization now coming into contact with a newer and different civilization and giving rise to results that conform to neither.

The city may be regarded, but only very incompletely, as a center from which spreads outward the idea of progress. It is true that progress, like the ideologies of nationalism, socialism, communism, capitalism and democracy, tends to form in cities and it is in cities that the prophets and leaders of these doctrines are formed. Yet the states of mind of Oriental and African peoples are not copies of the minds of Western exponents of progress or of one or another political or economic doctrine. There is something like a revolution of mood and aspiration in the non-European peoples today. The Easterner revolts against the West; he does not just take what can be borrowed from a city; he does sometimes the opposite: the Dutch language is set aside in Indonesia; there, anthropology, because associated with Dutch rule, does not spread from any city but is looked on with suspicion as associated with Dutch rule. Moreover, the influence of the West does not simply move outward from cities; it leap-frogs into country regions; a city reformer in Yucatan, Carrillo Puerto, arouses village Indians to join his civil war for progress and freedom against landowners and townspeople; Marxists discover that revolution can be based on the peasants without waiting for the development of an industrial proletariat.

The conception of progress is itself an idea shaped by and expressive of one culture or civilization, that of the recent West. What Toynbee and others have called the "Westernization" of the world may be the spread of only parts of the ideas associated in the West with the word "progress." Not without investigation can it be safely assumed that the spread of Western ideas from cities carries into the countryside a new and Western value system emphasizing hard work, enterprise, a favorable view of social change and a central faith in material prosperity. In the cases of some of the peoples affected by modern urbanization these values may be already present. In other cases the apparent spread of progress may turn out, on closer examination, to be a return to ancient values different from those of the West. Nationalistic movements are in

(38) For further discussion of these concepts of "mood," "aspiration" and "policy" as they might figure in community studies, see Redfield, The Little Community, chapter on "Little Community as a History."

(39) David Mitrany, Marx and the Peasants.

(40) See A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology, Secs. 127, 128; Milton Singer, Shame Cultures and Guilt Cultures, for an examination of some of the evidence on this point for American Indian cultures. Also see Redfield, A Village that Chose Progress, esp. Chapter 8, "Chan Kom, Its Ethos and Success. Recent material on cross-cultural comparisons of value systems will be found in Daryll Forde (ed.), African Worlds, and in the forthcoming publications of the Harvard Values Study Project directed by Clyde Kluckhohn.
part a nostalgic turning back to local traditional life. We shall understand better the varieties and complexities of the relations today between city and country as we compare the values and world views of the modernizing ideologies, and those of the Little and Great Traditions of the cultures and civilizations that are affected by the modern West. It may be that such studies will discover greater "ambivalence" in the mood to modernize than we, here in the West, acknowledge; that the progressive spirit of Asia and Africa is not simply a decision to walk the road of progressive convictions that we have traversed, but rather in significant part an effort of the "backward" peoples to recover from their disruptive encounters with the West by returning to the "sacred centers" of their ancient indigenous civilizations.

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THREE COMMENTS ON ORTHOGENETIC AND HETEROGENETIC URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

CITIES IN ANCIENT EGYPT

It is unwise to expect that the urban concentrations at the beginning of ancient Egyptian history will give us much light on the early history of cities. The Egyptians then lived and now live on the fertile alluvial soil. Their modern villages are likely to be located on top of the ancient sites. Further, the alluvial soil level may have risen twenty feet or more over five thousand years of history, so that ancient evidence would lie deep in moist and chemically active earth. It is a fact that the excavator in the valley of the Nile has dug dozens of temples and hundreds of tombs, both of which lie in the sandy desert, but he has yet to uncover what we could believe to be a typical city or town. We are forced to draw generalizations from such accidental survivals as a highly primitive prehistoric village of tiny size, two towns built for government workers in the cemetery areas, and a garden city newly founded by a "heretic pharaoh" about 1375 B.C. Since the workers' villages and the garden city were in some sense artificial constructions, they provide uncertain ground for our generalizations.

V. Gordon Childe, looking particularly at ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, has applied the term "urban revolution" to the social-economic-political process which marks the beginning of historic and "civilized" times. The term has a certain usefulness to guide our thinking, provided we do not take the words "urban" and "revolution" too seriously. The change of life from the primitive, agricultural, and undifferentiated to the civilized, urban, and specialized was a revolution, but it was a process which took thousands of years and which continued far down into historical times. Indeed, in some parts of Egypt and Mesopotamia the process was incomplete as late as one hundred years ago. Further, the term "urban" suggests too much of a teeming, cosmopolitan service center. One may look at the small size of many Mesopotamian mounds and of all Syrian and Palestinian towns, and one may guess at the size of Egyptian towns from the extraordinary number of them listed in ancient texts and from their apparent spatial limitations as calculated from the size of their surviving cemeteries: perhaps no more than twenty-five or forty acres. The result is a doubt whether Egypt from 3000 B.C. to 1400 B.C. had — apart from an administrative capital — any concentration of people and impersonal services which we should call a city. Agricultural centers, with services for agricultural communities, were apparently very numerous, but it is possible that there was no commercial metropolis serving a large province until one comes to the active imperial period around 1400.

The evidence from early historical Mesopotamia seems more promising in a number of ways. The cities were built near rivers or canals, which have shifted their courses, so that the mounds remain accessible for excavation. Such excavation, in addition to giving us the sizes and physical organizations of these towns, gives clay tablets of social or economic nature relating to the community. Further, Mesopotamia had a few places of really respectable size, such as the sacred city of Nippur, nearly two hundred acres in size. One still suspects, however, that the great majority of Mesopotamian "cities" will prove to be essentially agricultural centers, and as such useful in giving transitional stages toward urbanization.

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HELLENISTIC AND MUSLIM VIEWS ON CITIES

The problem of the classification of cities could probably be furthered by investigating the classifications developed by civilizations other than our own. In Hellenistic times as well as in medieval Islam the problem of function and organization of cities has been widely discussed. To the Greeks, as we can learn from Pausanias (d. after A.D. 176), a city is a settlement which possesses its own government, a gymnasium, theater, and a market, which is an economically viable entity and has political representation with its neighbors. The Greek polis is an autonomous closed corporation which even when within the territory of a prince or under his suzerainty retains such exemptive privileges as vest in it the right to define the criteria of citizenship. As a rule it possesses a written constitution which provides for legislative and administrative machinery. In general the city officials are elected, mostly by ballot, sometimes by lot. The Muslims, on the other hand, conceive of the city as a place, in fact as the only place, where the precepts of their religion can be completely fulfilled and where the social ideals implicit in Islam can be fully realized. So they define the town as a permanent settlement possessing a "cathedral mosque" — that is to say, a mosque in which the Friday noon service can be held — and a daily market. Besides, the public bath is usually mentioned when the essential elements of a city are enumerated (you may remember that total ablutions are on certain occasions required by Islam). Muslim law does not grant the city a specific status. As a matter of fact, it does not deal with the city as such, even though it shows an active concern with a multitude of problems that have their origin in city life, such as difficulties of traffic, regulations of house and street building, the relations between landlord and tenant, and even the nature and powers of various city officials. Yet Muslim law recognizes only the one and indivisible "Muhammadan community" of which every believer is a citizen in virtue of his adherence to the faith. It does not in its classical form develop a concept of citizenship in a particular state, let alone accord a special status to an individual as the citizen of a particular settlement. The town, then, defined by its suitability as a center of religious life, possesses a typical administrative apparatus in that its business is taken care of by three separate authorities; a governor, usually a military man, heads the executive; a religious judge presides over the canon law courts and has charge of the funds of the pious foundations; and the muhtasib (or market inspector) is responsible not only for the maintenance of appropriate standards of production and fair trading but acts, besides, as a kind of censor to whom the task is entrusted "to command the good and to prohibit the bad." Under this structure of officialdom organizations of tradesmen and craftsmen lead more or less their own life. As a rule, the city receives its military protection through the governor; it is expected to contribute through taxation the monies necessary to pay for the soldiers, but it is not expected to levy a militia of its own.

To organizations of the kind that the Greeks and the Muslims developed, the concepts of orthogenetic and heterogenic would have a somewhat different meaning from the one we might want to associate with those terms. As soon as a Greek-speaking élite would have taken over an oriental city, it would to them have become orthogenetic. On the other hand, the oriental natives would never quite accept the Greek-dominated town as part of their own civilization. Alexandria always remained "by Egypt" (ad Aegyptum) rather than "in Egypt" (in Aegypto).

Muslims regard as a foreign city a settlement which is under the control of people of a different religion. Muslims would, of course, rule non-Muslim cities and they would organize them as much as possible according to Muslim law. Mosques would be built almost overnight and an officialdom of
the Muslim type would be imposed over the native organizational structure. A truly foreign city within the domain of Islam came into effective existence only when the West penetrated the Muslim lands. Casablanca is perhaps the most drastically non-Islamic town in Muslim territory.

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ORTHOGENETIC AND HETEROGENETIC CITIES IN THE MODERN WORLD

I find the classification proposed by Redfield and Singer very useful in illuminating significantly different relations of cities to their tributary areas.

With respect to heterogenous cities one does not need to go to present-day colonial areas to find good examples. The Roman occupation of Britain as described by the historians Collingwood and Myres, the German movement eastward into the Slavic lands of Poland or the Baltic lands, and the Russian movement westward into White Russia or the Ukraine, or southward into the Caucasus, or southeastward into Central Asia provide excellent examples of urban cultural, economic, and political penetration by one culture into another. Typically the rural area is relatively homogeneous ethnically, whereas the city is complex, with both local native elements and introduced urban groups from outside the area. In present-day cities of the Caucasus or Central Asia, for example, cities typically have three or more important urban groups but often only a single rural group.

An American example of a special type of orthogenetic city is provided by Salt Lake City. There is a reversal of the typical development, however, in which the city grows out of the hinterland, in that Salt Lake City was the first settled point in the Mormon occupation of the region and that it was the center from which virtually the entire settlement was planned, organized, and administered by the ecclesiastical élite. Some 70,000 European emigrants were brought into the region and settled under direction of church authorities in the city. The city has continued to dominate the hinterland culturally and religiously, though, with the coming of the railroad heterogenous elements of "Gentile" tradesmen, government officials, and mining and other activities of Eastern corporations, the traditional mores and attitudes were confronted with contrasting and often antagonistic cultural elements. One German geographer has spoken of the resulting Americanization of the cultural landscape.


The point raised by Richard Wohl about how external ideas get into a system is both pertinent and important. How a system under heterogenetic impacts absorbs elements under the guise, conscious or unconscious, that the elements are really orthogenetic, i.e., that they are outgrowths of the local culture, can be illustrated also by many transformations in attitudes of the Mormons under the impact of outside forces focused on Salt Lake City. In the abandonment of polygamy, for example, under severe legal, political, and economic pressure from the Federal government, members of the Church were reacting directly not to the pressure but rather to an official church abandonment. Indeed one governmental official complained that it was the advice of the local leaders that was being followed instead of the dictation of federal statutes. But there is a lesson in this in that new ideas, techniques, motivations, or values can often (if not usually or invariably) be introduced through local élitists who effect some rationalization with existing cultural patterns.

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